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Senseless Kindness:
The Politics of Cost-Benefit Analysis
By Louis E. Wolcher*
Abstract
This essay dwells on a social phenomenon that the Russian-Jewish novelist and war cor-
respondent Vasily Grossman calls “senseless kindness.”1 Emerging without prior warning
from certain face-to-face encounters between human beings, the striking reversal of prefer-
ences that characterizes this phenomenon can be used to cast a critical light on the practices of
Cost-Benefit Analysis (“CBA”). Not only does senseless kindness highlight the troubling theo-
retical problem of determining the “correct” ex ante—the point in time at which CBA measures
people’s preferences—it also suggests a more general critique of CBA’s indifference to how
preferences are formed and expressed. This essay shows that CBA ignores the concrete ex-
periences of everyday human sociality and communicative action by modeling them in all in-
stances as “transaction costs” to be reduced or avoided rather than celebrated, or at least stud-
ied for their meaning. Missing from CBA is any sense that the face-to-face encounter between
human beings is, or can be, a moment of both individuation (of the participants) and transfor-
mation (of their preferences), in which genuine freedom and politics, in the largest senses of
these words, are first made possible. Obsessed with what preferences are, CBA ignores the
question of how they emerge. The result is not just a partial and partisan view of the possibili-
ties for human decision making, but also a technique that puts the validity claims of individual
preferences beyond all question and rational deliberation. Skeptical or afraid of government’s
ability to change culture, certain scientistically-minded decision makers are happy to rely on a
technique that purports merely to reflect information about “what the people want.” However,
CBA does not in fact mirror preferences as they are; instead, it constructs them as they would
be if the entire meaning and value of human reason were reduced to purely instrumental
(means-ends) calculations on the basis of correct technique, and if (per impossible) all contexts
of people’s life histories in concrete forms of life were somehow removed. Purporting to be a
descriptive science of what people just happen to prefer, CBA’s theoretical model actually often
produces a peculiarly asocial account of what their preferences ought to be.
I. Knowledge and Opinion
Distilled to its essence, philosophy’s most valuable contribution to social science is constantly to
remind it that what is unquestioned is not necessarily unquestionable. In the West, this willingness
(indeed, passion) to question began when the Greeks, from whom we have inherited most of our phi-
losophical and scientific traditions, drew a fundamental distinction between knowledge (epist m )
and opinion (doxa).2 The distinction was fundamental for them because almost all Greek thinkers
* Charles I. Stone Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, William H. Gates Hall, Box 353020, Seattle,
Washington 98195-3020, USA. E-mail address: wolcher@u.washington.edu.
1. VASILY GROSSMAN, LIFE AND FATE 409 (Robert Chandler trans., Harper & Row 1985) (1980).
2. The meanings of, and interrelations among, the various Greek terms that are mentioned in the text receive a much
more detailed and subtle treatment in MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PLATO’S SOPHIST passim (Richard Rojcewicz & André Schuwer
trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1997) (1992).
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starting with Parmenides ranked theoretical knowledge of that-which-is (ousias, or being) above the
unquestioned and “obvious” truths of common sense.3 Classifying the attainment of pure knowledge
and wisdom (sophia) as an end in itself, they also ranked it above mere know-how (phron sis).4
Phron sis is practical and consists in the use of instrumental reason as a means for achieving par-
ticular ends in politics, material production, and daily life. While the Greeks did not deny that
phron sis possesses its own kind of truth—the kind that pertains to effective action (praxis) in the
sphere of production (techn )—they also believed that phron sis takes far too much for granted
about the world to be able to penetrate beneath the outward appearance (eidos) of things and, in a
moment of pure viewing (theoria), catch sight of them as they really are.5 Although doxa is always
content to take what “they” say about a thing for granted, those who pursue the hard path of epis-
t m know that “a thing’s real constitution has a tendency to conceal itself.”6 Hence truth, for Greek
philosophers, was not an idea or a statement in accord with some already-visible “fact”; rather, their
word for truth, al theia, signifies un-concealment,7 and therefore is tied to the arduous effort of un-
covering something in its truth—something that would have remained hidden and obscure but for
the event of un-concealment.8
These ancient distinctions cast an interesting light on the modern social scientific practice that
calls itself "Cost-Benefit Analysis."9 Standing on the theoria side of the opposition between knowl-
edge and opinion, CBA finds itself in the unusual position of seeking theoretical knowledge about
mere opinions, as opposed to theoretical knowledge about some underlying reality or truth that
commonsensical attitudes may have distorted. As the Greeks would have said, probably with a cer-
tain degree of contempt, CBA seeks epist m about doxa: that is, it acquires theoretical knowledge
concerning human opinions—in the form of individual preferences—most of which are themselves
pre- or un-theoretical. What is more, CBA is a positive social science in the modern sense of the
word—that is, a fact-oriented technique for producing useful results—and therefore is generally dis-
inclined to question its own grounds.10 For example, although it is well known that a person’s re-
vealed preferences are in part a function of her existing level of wealth,11 CBA accepts the existing
legal distribution of entitlements in society as a pre-given “fact.”12 Given CBA’s uncritical attitude
towards questions of distributive justice, the legitimacy of its policy or welfare recommendations
necessarily depends on the (unquestioned) legitimacy of the particular property rights that underlie
the relevant supply and demand functions,13 and that co-determine the “psychological reference
point” for people’s subjective beliefs about ownership.14
Putting all questions of legitimacy aside for the moment, it must also be said that CBA shows
little, if any, intellectual interest in the question of why people have the preferences they have, or
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS 71 (T.M. Robinson trans., 1987).
7. For a general discussion of the relationship between the Greek notion of truth (al theia) and its subsequent Latin in-
carnation as veritas, which ultimately came to signify mere “correctness,” see MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BASIC QUESTIONS OF
PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED “PROBLEMS” OF “LOGIC” 95-108 (Richard Rojcewicz & André Schuwer trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1994)
(1984).
8. See id. at 88-93.
9. See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 9-24 (2006) (ex-
plaining the theoretical basis for CBA).
10. Cf. RICHARD ZERBE, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 16 (2001) (arguing that CBA should provide useful
information and be widely accepted, and that the rule chosen through CBA should be superior to all other rules).
11. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 9 at 130-31 (noting that textbook CBA does not adjust for preference distortions
caused by wealth).
12. See Paul Heyne, The Foundations of Law and Economics: Can the Blind Lead the Blind?, 11 RES. L. & ECON. 53, 56
(1988) (“Economic theory takes for granted, far more extensively than economists seem generally to recognize, the normative
force of established rights and obligations.”). See also ZERBE, supra note 10, at 27.
13. Heyne, supra note 12, at 53-71.
14. See ZERBE, supra note 10, at 83 (discussing the psychological reference point).
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why their willingness to pay (“WTP”) to achieve gains and their willingness to accept (“WTA”) to
compensate for losses are what they are at any given point in time. It is true, of course, that rational
choice theory has always been aware, at least at some level of consciousness, that people’s prefer-
ences are affected by the opportunities afforded them by their individual experiences and by prevail-
ing social and institutional arrangements—in short, by history in the largest sense of the word. 15
From the small (what we eat and wear) to the large (our various political and cultural institutions),
different epochs and cultures produce different “opportunity sets” from which individuals are re-
quired to choose.16 Given this existential truth, a (very) few rational choice theorists have called for
CBA to take the “why”-question more seriously, perhaps by making it into an object of analysis, or,
better still, a formal variable in the theory. Robert Higgs, for example, alleges that rational choice
theory ought to take account of the powerful influence of ideology on preference-formation,17 while
Michael Hechter observes (and bemoans) economists’ relatively low level of theoretical sophistication
about what he calls the “micro-macro link” connecting individual preferences to their social condi-
tions.18 Despite these and other calls for CBA to broaden its scope of inquiry, however, its main-
stream practitioners by and large remain uninterested in the question of why people have the pref-
erences they have; indeed, some of these practitioners even go so far as to display their indifference
in this respect as if it were an intellectual badge of honor.19 For CBA, it is enough that people simply
appear (out of nowhere, so to speak) with measurable WTPs and WTAs that can be summed up and
then brought into a quantitative relationship that determines whether a given project is or is not ef-
ficient.
In thinking about CBA’s theoretical and practical indifference to “Why?,” it is important to re-
member that this question, though exceedingly common in everyday speech, is nonetheless ambigu-
ous in the present context. The question “Why?” can seek factual information about the causes and
conditions of a preference, or it can inquire after the preference’s grounds. The first kind of inquiry
aims at a historical explanation; the second seeks a normative reason or justification. To illustrate:
a person who says she wants to keep the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge free from all oil exploration
may explain her preference by appealing to the fact that her parents raised her to love nature (a
causal answer to “Why?”) or by saying that drilling in ANWR is the environmentally and morally
wrong thing to do (a normative answer to “Why?”). Although CBA’s indifference to the purely his-
torical explanation of preferences can (perhaps) be defended on the basis of an academic division of
labor that assigns causal questions to disciplines like history, sociology, and psychology, reserving
so-called “economic” and “policymaking” questions to CBA, the roots of its indifference to the norma-
tive grounds of preferences lie much deeper. Whether consciously or unconsciously, CBA, like many
modern social-scientific disciplines, has wholeheartedly appropriated Max Weber’s central thesis
that the environing world—the human world in both its natural and social dimensions—has become
disenchanted.20
Beginning with the Enlightenment, human reason in the form of science and technology has
been achieving an ever-increasing mastery of natural and social processes.21 And while this mastery
has delivered many material benefits to human beings, it is also true, as Western thinkers from
15. See generally Peter Abell, Sociological Theory and Rational Choice Theory, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO SOCIAL
THEORY 223, 223-44 (Bryan S. Turner ed., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing rational choice theory and preference formation).
16. See Nicolas Gravel, Can a Ranking of Opportunity Sets Attach an Intrinsic Importance to Freedom of Choice?, AM.
ECON. REV., May 1994, at 454 (defining “opportunity sets”).
17. ROBERT HIGGS, CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 35-56 (1987).
18. See Michael Hechter, The Micro-Macro Link in Rational Choice Theory, PERSP.: THEORY SECTION NEWSL. (AM. SOC.
ASS’N), July 1992, at 1, 1-2.
19. See, e.g., Heyne, supra note 12, at 57 (“It is quite true that economists take the existing system for granted in their
work; it would make no sense to do anything else.”).
20. 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 506 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968).
21. See generally M.J. Inwood, Enlightenment, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 236, 236-37 (Ted Honderich
ed., 1995) (describing the Enlightenment and criticism of its doctrines).
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Plato22 to Weber23 have rightly reminded us, that science as such can give no answer to the question
of how we should live or what we should do. Moreover, one need not be a Luddite to notice that
there can be troubling byproducts of scientific and technological mastery, including especially losses
at the emotional and psychological level. For by gradually dissolving the irrational elements and ef-
fects of superstitions, prejudices, errors, and religious orthodoxies in society, instrumental reason
has also undermined people’s faith that there is a stable and agreed-upon ultimate meaning of the
world.24 To put this in terms that are familiar to CBA, there are important existential costs that
many people (or peoples) might have been willing to pay to avoid—and that many indeed did pay to
avoid, both in treasure and in blood—on account of the very historical changes that made the disci-
pline of CBA imaginable in the first place.25
An ultimate meaning is not the same as an end in the sense of the means-ends relationship:
ends are what means aim at, whereas meaning shows itself within the very historical process of us-
ing means to accomplish ends. For example, the relentless pursuit of consumer goods by earning as
much money as possible to pay for them can be explained as the rational use of means to accomplish
material ends, but the ultimate meaning of consumerism as a way of life cannot be so easily ex-
plained.26 In short, our gain of technological control over the world (as a means) has co-produced the
loss of any stable sense that the world (as an end) possesses a rational meaning that is truly "uni-
versal," that is, one which all rational beings are bound to acknowledge. The converse is also true, of
course, since experience teaches that the scientific spirit’s degree of vigor is inversely proportional to
the number of sacred cows that stand in its way. While the empirical result of this dialectical proc-
ess of gain-and-loss is a formally rationalized social system—one that maximizes the ability of indi-
viduals to calculate the consequences of their actions—the resulting content of social life can none-
theless be seen as substantively irrational from the standpoint of ultimate values such as
brotherliness, social justice, or even the attainment of individual happiness.27 Weber’s metaphor of
the “iron cage” of rationality shows that a social system can become instrumentally rational to the
highest degree without necessarily affording the people within it the chance to imagine and pursue a
substantively rational way of life.28 Witness the all-too-familiar phenomena in fully industrialized
societies such as the United States and Japan of “living to work” (instead of the other way around),
“the rat race,” and the consumerist imperative of “keeping up with the Joneses.”29
Thus it has come to pass that post-Enlightenment world history, in the form of what Nietzsche
22. PLATO, Charmides, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 99, 119 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds.,
1961).
23. MAX WEBER, Science As a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 143 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright
Mills eds. & trans., 1958).
24. See id. at 142 (“If these natural sciences lead to anything in this way, they are apt to make the belief that there is such
a thing as ‘meaning’ of the universe die out at its very roots.”).
25. See, e.g., William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-51
(2005) (describing “brutal reality of invasion, slavery, forced relocation, genocide, land theft, ethnocide, and forcible denial of
the right to self-determination” that defines the United States’ historical treatment of American Indians); see also id. at 20
n.104 (citing the United States Supreme Court’s discussion in Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877), that American
Indians, “largely influenced by superstition and fetishism, . . . are essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people. . . .
[A]s a superior and civilized nation [the U.S. has] the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all
dependent Indian communities within its borders.”).
26. This is more or less what Heidegger meant when he declared that “the essence of technology is nothing technological.”
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3,
35 (William Lovitt trans., 1977).
27. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL AND MORAL THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER
61-87 (Routledge 1991) (1984).
28. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 123-25 (Talcott Parsons trans., Routledge Clas-
sics 2001) (1930). We actually owe the phrase “iron cage” to Talcott Parsons, who translated Weber’s German expression, ein
stahlhartes Gehäuse. The expression can also be translated as “a casing, or housing, as hard as steel.” DEREK SAYER,
CAPITALISM AND MODERNITY: AN EXCURSUS ON MARX AND WEBER 144 (1991).
29. See Paul Krugman, Money Can’t Buy Happiness. Er, Can It?, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1999, at A23; James Sterngold, Life
in a Box: Japanese Question Fruits of Success, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, at A1.
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calls the “advent of nihilism,”30 has brought forth a scientific discipline (CBA) that interprets the
world as a kind of warehouse or store that is full of material fit only for the purposive-rational pur-
suit of individual interests, whatever they may be. CBA is nihilistic in the precise Nietzschean sense
that its highest value—respect for individual choices—has devalued itself by removing any objective
criterion of the rightness or reasonableness of choices.31 According to Weber, the rationality that
predominates in, and even defines, modernity is an instrumental, or means-end, kind of rationality
(Zweckrationalität).32 Instrumental reason is purposive: it aims to harness the object world and
other human beings in the service of particular interests. In place of a universal morality predicated
on tradition-based consensus, social life thus shows itself to CBA as a plurality of competing “values”
encoded in “interests.”
From the standpoint of the neo-Kantian metaphysics of subjectivity that explicitly informs We-
berian thought (and implicitly informs CBA), values cannot be rationally grounded, only chosen.33
CBA performs the alchemy of transforming these admittedly incommensurable values into commen-
surable preferences only by counting people’s ability to back their values up with cash in the form of
WTPs and WTAs.34 But of course the result of a purely arithmetical balance between cash bids and
counter-bids cannot make a project (or its absence) right or reasonable if the individual values that
motivate the bids are themselves immune to all rational criticism. If it is true that some, or many,
CBA practitioners personally prefer a politics that is committed to creating ever greater individual
“freedom” in the world, then it is also true that CBA itself gives them no criterion to distinguish be-
tween mindless licentiousness and the rational exercise of freedom. The dominant tradition of politi-
cal liberalism defines freedom negatively, as the mere absence of certain government constraints on
choice.35 But if one is “free” by this definition, how is one supposed to rationally choose one’s values
in a disenchanted world, a world in which all traditional modes of grounding values have lost their
binding force? This is a question that CBA does not and will not answer. Although someone like
Kant might define genuine freedom as self-legislation according to the universal moral law within,36
in today’s completely disenchanted age there are many competing and plausible claims about what
the moral law is and what it requires.37 It would therefore seem that CBA cannot espouse Kant’s or
anyone else’s positive definition of freedom without running the risk of losing its “objectivity,” and
thereby becoming overtly political instead of resolutely "scientific."
When it still thought of itself as political economy,38 the discipline of economics actually cared
about the problem of how the economic system (pertaining to the material reproduction of society)
affects and interacts with the various normative systems that integrate individuals into the social
order (the symbolic reproduction of society). For instance, the late John Kenneth Galbraith, who
made a point of describing himself as a political economist, once quoted with approval a colleague’s
opinion that the “the economist, like everyone else, must concern himself with the ultimate aims of
man.”39 But today, as Jürgen Habermas has noted, economics as a specialized science has broken off
30. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 3 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans.,
Random House 1967) (1901).
31. Id. at 9 (defining nihilism in terms of a society’s ultimate values devaluing themselves).
32. BRUBAKER, supra note 27, at 51-53.
33. I am referring to so-called “Marburg neo-Kantianism,” according to which science, ethics, and law are said to exist
solely as cultural products, and instead of there being a thing-in-itself there exist only competing constructions of the world.
See Lewis Beck, Neo-Kantianism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 21, at 611, 611-12.
34. See ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE 33-36 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing
the theoretical limitations of using WTP as the basis for social ordering).
35. See Louis E. Wolcher, The Paradox of Remedies: The Case of International Human Rights Law, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 515, 555 (2000).
36. See IMMANUEL KANT, The Metaphysics of Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 154 (Carl Friedrich ed., 1993).
37. See generally Nicholas Dent, Moral Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra note 21, at 586, 586;
Richard Norman, History of Moral Philosophy, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 586, 586-91.
38. Weber, for example, styled himself a “political economist.” WEBER, supra note 23, at 129.
39. John Kenneth Galbraith, THE NATION, May 22, 2006, at 4-5.
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the relation between material reproduction and symbolic reproduction and has absolved itself of any
questions about the legitimacy of the social order, including its possible pathologies.40 Today’s
economists construe rationality in purely functional terms—as a means to economic equilibrium and
rational choice—and economics as a discipline loses its historical connection to the rational study
and evaluation of the socio-political structures within which all equilibriums and choice occur. In
particular, CBA becomes a kind of semi-autonomous administrative system, and its connection to the
life world is maintained at only one discrete point: the point at which CBA intervenes to measure
preferences. The forces that shape preferences go unexamined, with the result that CBA can con-
tribute nothing to the study and development of the public sphere where preferences are continu-
ously being formed and reformed within the “Bacchanalian whirl” of their sheer becoming-in-time.41
It is therefore unsurprising that CBA fails to address the question of whether individual prefer-
ences are well-grounded in ethics, morality, or some other normative system: as an empirical social
science, CBA is configured in such a way that it lacks any mechanism for adjudicating the validity of
people’s preferences. One might even go so far as to say that the very existence of CBA as a well-
respected discipline tends to prove Nietzsche’s thesis that in today’s world “the highest values de-
valuate themselves. The aim is lacking; ‘why?’ finds no answer.”42 Instead of why, we find the mere
what of WTPs and WTAs—entities crafted in advance as pristine numerical quantities supremely
suited for the task of scientific management and control. Habermas describes the situation of CBA
perfectly when he says that “the situation to be regulated [or analyzed], which is embedded in the
context of a life-history and a concrete form of life, has to be subjected to violent abstraction, not only
because it has to be subsumed under a law but also in order that it can be dealt with administra-
tively.”43 The radical abstraction of reality that is performed by modern social science, including es-
pecially CBA, underscores the fact that there is an intimate connection between CBA’s methods and
purely administrative modes of decision making. Once its numerical data on preferences is collected,
CBA’s calculations lead directly to administration, bypassing the processes that are constantly so-
cializing and individuating the people whose lives will be affected by the decisions that administra-
tion makes. Perhaps this explains why certain CBA practitioners admit that their criterion of eco-
nomic efficiency “does not tell us ‘the right thing to do’ in a transcendent moral or spiritual sense.”44
Implicit in this way of thinking about values is a contestable (albeit historically understandable)
view about the nature of morality: namely, that moral actions are always deduced once and for all
by individuals from personally chosen criteria that are immune both to rational criticism and to the
messy historical processes in which individual preferences—including moral preferences—are
formed and expressed.
II. Why and How
Although CBA’s indifference to the question “Why?” in both its causal and normative senses is
understandable, given CBA’s history, the same cannot be said about its equally profound indifference
to the question of how preferences are formed. The questions “Why?” and “How?” do not seek the
same kind of knowledge. Why a thing is pertains to its antecedents or its grounds—its historical
causes or normative reasons—but how a thing is always co-determines what it is. The causal why of
a thing is usually investigated by those who are concerned with general laws of human action and
the useful explanations they afford, whereas the normative why is usually investigated by those who
40. 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 4 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
41. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S PREFACE TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 153 (Yirmiyahu Yovel
trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2005) (1807) (“Appearance [the phenomenon] is the generation and passing away which itself is
neither generated nor passes away, but is in itself and constitutes the actuality of truth and the movement of its life. The true
is thus the Bacchanalian whirl . . . .”).
42. NIETZSCHE, supra note 30, at 9.
43. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 40, at xxxiv.
44. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 29.
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care about its legitimacy. In contrast, determining the unified what-and-how of a thing requires on-
tological investigation and aims toward a description rather than an explanation or a justification.
That these different ways of making sense of the world sometimes find themselves in tension, or
even at cross-purposes, is indicated by a remark of Wittgenstein’s: “People who are constantly ask-
ing ‘why’ are like tourists who stand in front of a building reading Baedeker and are so busy reading
the history of its construction, etc., that they are prevented from seeing the building.”45 Putting why
aside for a moment, one could say that what and how are opposite sides of the same coin—different
aspects of one and the same being. To borrow a distinction from the medieval Scholastics, the what-
being (essentia) of an individual preference is its determination as a present entity possessing such-
and-such attributes, whereas its how-being (existentia) consists in its having a certain mode of exis-
tence—a manner or style of persisting (and perhaps changing) through time.46.
It is tempting to think that CBA is a perfect example of what Edmund Husserl describes as “the
positivistic reduction of the idea of science to mere factual science”—the kind of science that turns
away from the enigma of subjectivity to mere calculation based on what is taken for granted about
individual preferences.47 Despite Husserl’s unflattering hypothesis that “merely fact-minded sci-
ences make for merely fact-minded people,”48 one would like to think that the formation and expres-
sion of preferences as lived phenomena would be of great interest to CBA, especially if it could be
demonstrated that the scientific truth of a preference’s “what”-being cannot be thought independ-
ently of its “how”-being. To borrow one of the earlier-noted distinctions drawn by the Greeks, the dif-
ficult task of un-concealing knowledge (epist m ) about the nature of preferences is not the same as
taking one’s unreflective opinion (doxa) about preferences for granted.49 And indeed it is true: the
proposition that the what and the how of preferences are inextricably linked has been convincingly
demonstrated by behavioral economists.50
Once considered marginal and exotic by mainstream economists, the academic discipline of be-
havioral economics has shown experimentally that phenomena such as “framing” can vitally affect
the outcomes that people choose, even (or especially) when all available choices are mathematically
equivalent. For example, in an important 1981 paper, Tversky and Kahneman described an experi-
ment with subjects who were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which the United States is
preparing for an outbreak of an unusual disease that is expected to kill 600 people.51 First asked to
choose between Program A that would save a projected 200 people and Program B that carries a one-
third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no one will be saved,
72% of the subjects in the experiment chose Program A, even though the expected outcomes of the
two programs are identical.52 Then the experimenters restated the problem, presenting subjects with
a choice between Program C, in which 400 people will die, and Program D, in which there is a one-
third probability that no one will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 will die.53 This time 78%
chose Program D, despite the fact that it is mathematically equivalent to Program C.54 The differ-
ence between the two experiments consists solely in the manner in which the choices were expressed:
45. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 40e (G.H. Von Wright ed., Peter Winch trans., Basil Blackwell Oxford
1980) (1977).
46. On the distinction between essentia and existentia, see MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LOGIC 177-178 (Michael Heim trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1984) (1978).
47. EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 5-7 (David Carr
trans., Nw. Univ. Press 1970) (1954).
48. Id. at 6.
49. See supra notes 2-8. 
 50. See infra text accompanying notes 51-56.
51. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453
(1981).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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lives “saved” versus lives “lost.”55 It appears that people are risk-averse when it comes to saving
lives, but risk takers when it comes to lives being lost, despite the fact that “saving” and “losing” are
strictly correlative terms in the overall context of the two opportunity sets. The paper thus provides
a classic (and elegant) example of what the authors aptly call a “framing effect” within the phenome-
non of choice.56
Experiments like this show that by manipulating the environment in which preferences are ex-
pressed—that is, manipulating the how of preference formation—behavioral economists can observe
measurable differences in what those preferences are. However, while the insight of behavioral
economists into the constitutive relation between how and what is unquestionably an improvement
over the aprioristic deduction of preferences from a purely mathematical model of rational choice,
behavioral economics is still at bottom a causal science. That is, it conceives of social mechanisms
such as framing as mere variables that produce measurable outcomes in people’s choices. It subor-
dinates or ignores what goes on as preferences are formed in order to determine what the prefer-
ences ultimately “are” in relation to the different modes of framing that precede them. In other
words, what goes on while people are forming their preferences in an experiment such as Tversky’s
and Kahneman’s is of interest to behavioral economics only insofar as it can be correlated with a dif-
ference in the outcomes people choose. That the event of preference-formation as such might be wor-
thy of investigation does not occur to behavioral economists any more than it does to the practitio-
ners of CBA.
Thus, behavioral economics remains just as indifferent as CBA is to the phenomenological di-
mension of human preferences: their “how” as seen from within, namely, as lived phenomena. At
one level this is understandable: no science can proceed without constructing its objects in a manner
that allows them to be measured. But when one considers that CBA’s entire raison d’être is to assist
government in deciding whether and how to proceed with projects that will affect people’s lives for
better or worse, then the directly political application of CBA makes its methodological decisions all
the more significant.57 I will argue in what follows that by recognizing preferences only insofar as
they fit into pre-established functional units that are fit for measurement, CBA creates a kind of bu-
reaucratic blindness to the spontaneous processes of opinion- and will-formation. And this blind-
ness, in turn, makes it easier for decision makers to decouple their political decisions from the con-
crete, identity-forming contexts in which people’s preferences actually arise, as well as to avoid
investing in public institutions that would make widespread popular deliberation and discussion of
competing political preferences possible.
III. Senseless Kindness
This essay’s primary goal is to bring the phenomenological dimension of preference formation
and expression to light as part of a critical assessment of CBA’s purely theoretical structure. Since
this leads inevitably to a demonstration of CBA’s ideological effects, I will leave for another day the
difficult question of whether and how CBA’s model can be applied in the real world to yield informa-
tion about preferences that could reasonably be called reliable by CBA’s own criteria. Economists
are able to measure revealed preferences because WTPs and WTAs appear in consummated (and
hence theoretically observable) market transactions where people put their money where their
mouths are, so to speak. But CBA considers itself relevant to government decision making precisely
because the market has not provided a solution to the problems of public policy that it analyzes. The
difficult task of developing a method for researching people’s WTPs and WTAs in the absence of ac-
tual transactions where all relevant preferences are revealed thus becomes particularly important
for CBA. Nevertheless, in this essay I will bracket and ignore this problem of application, not be-
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION ix (2002).
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cause I think it is uninteresting, but because I want to focus on CBA’s theoretical model itself, as
that model stands in relation both to what it purports to model and to its implications for the possi-
bility of a genuinely democratic form of politics.
The term “senseless kindness” in this essay’s title comes from a scene in Life and Fate, an epic
novel about Stalinist repression and the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union during the Second World
War.58 Its author, Vasily Grossman, was a Russian-Jewish novelist and war correspondent for Kras-
naya Zvezda, or Red Star, the official newspaper of the Red Army.59 Although the manuscript was
actively suppressed by the authorities,60 Vladimir Voinovich, one of the principal Soviet dissidents of
the mid-1970s, managed to smuggle a microfilm copy abroad,61 and the novel was eventually pub-
lished in 1980, sixteen years after the author’s death.62 The recent discovery and publication of
Grossman’s wartime notebooks has made it clear that many, if not most, of the war scenes in the
novel are based on actual incidents that Grossman heard about or observed as a correspondent.63
Grossman was embedded (as we would say today) with Soviet forces as they retreated in panic fol-
lowing Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June of 1941,64 as they fought from near-disaster to
victory during the nightmarish battle of Stalingrad in 1942-43,65 and as the Red Army made its slow
but relentless advance from central Russia all the way to Berlin and the end of the war in May of
1945.66
The phrase “senseless kindness” first appears in the context of Grossman’s description of a pu-
nitive action aimed at a Russian village by a German military unit bent on “exact[ing] vengeance for
the murder of two soldiers.”67 An Aktion like countless others perpetrated throughout the Soviet Un-
ion by the S.S. and the Wehrmacht, this particular event contains a small but striking detail that
underscores the bewildering complexity of human nature.68 The operation began late in the after-
noon.69 The Germans entered the village, ordered its women to dig a large pit at the edge of the for-
est, and rounded up and held twenty male peasants for execution at daybreak the following morn-
ing.70 One of the women whose husband had been seized was also forced to quarter several German
soldiers overnight in her hut.71 The next morning, as the Germans were checking their machine-
guns, the eldest of them somehow pulled his trigger by mistake and shot himself in the stomach.72
His compatriots bandaged his wound as best they could, laid him on a cot in the woman’s hut, and
went outside to begin shooting the captives.73 They left the woman alone in charge of the wounded
soldier and motioned for her to watch over him.74 Grossman describes what happened next:
The woman thought to herself how simple it would be to strangle him. There he was, muttering
58. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 409.
59. VASILY GROSSMAN, A WRITER AT WAR: VASILY GROSSMAN WITH THE RED ARMY 1941-45, at vii (Anthony Beevor & Luba
Vinogradova eds. & trans., 2005).
60. After the KGB seized what it thought were all existing copies of the manuscript, a Communist Party official told
Grossman that there could be no question of Life and Fate being published for another 200 years. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at
9.
61. Id. at 15.
62. Id. at 10.
63. GROSSMAN, supra note 59, at xvii.
64. Id. at xi.
65. Id. at xiv.
66. Id. at xvii. See also Verlyn Klinkenborg, Westward into War with the Soviet Novelist and Reporter Vasily Grossman,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A28 (“What the war gave Grossman were the materials and the mind to write ‘Life and Fate,’ ar-
guably the greatest Russian novel of the 20th century.”).
67. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 408-409.
68. See id. at 408.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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away, his eyes closed, weeping, sucking his lips. . . Suddenly he opened his eyes and said in very
clear Russian: ‘Water, Mother.’ ‘Damn you,’ said the woman. ‘What I should do is strangle you.’
Instead she gave him some water. He grabbed her by the hand and signed to her to help him sit up:
he couldn’t breathe because of the bleeding. She pulled him up and he clasped his arms round her
neck. Suddenly there was a volley of shots outside and the woman began to tremble. Afterwards
she told people what she had done. No one could understand; nor could she explain it herself. This
senseless kindness is condemned in the fable about the pilgrim who warmed a snake in his bosom.
It is the kindness that has mercy on a tarantula that has bitten a child. A mad, blind kindness.
People enjoy looking in stories and fables for examples of the danger of this senseless kindness. But
one shouldn’t be afraid of it. One might just as well be afraid of a freshwater fish carried out by
chance into the salty ocean. The harm from time to time occasioned a society, class, race or State by
this senseless kindness fades away in the light that emanates from those who are endowed with it.
This kindness, this stupid kindness, is what is most truly human in a human being. It is what sets
man apart, the highest achievement of his soul. No, it says, life is not evil!75
Many other gratuitous and unforeseen acts of kindness appear in this book, and, in a good illus-
tration of form following content, they seem to occur almost randomly during the course of the narra-
tive. To mention but one other example, there is a scene in which a captured German officer and his
men are removing decomposing bodies from a basement in Stalingrad at the end of the battle in the
winter of 1943.76 A woman in a crowd of Russian onlookers takes great delight in witnessing the ob-
vious misery and suffering of the Germans, who have been forced by Russian troops to perform this
heinous task.77 At one point the Germans bring out the corpse of an adolescent girl on a stretcher,
and the woman collapses and wails in grief when she sees that it is the body of her daughter.78 Get-
ting to her feet, the woman begins to stride angrily toward the captive officer, and a Russian guard
lets her pass.79 Sensing that she is about to take vengeance, the crowd cannot take their eyes off
her.80 The narrative continues:
The woman could no longer see anything at all except the face of the German with the handkerchief
round his mouth. Not understanding what was happening to her, governed by a power she had just
now seemed to control, she felt in the pocket of her jacket for a piece of bread that had been given to
her the evening before by a soldier. She held it out to the German officer and said: ‘There, have
something to eat.’ Afterwards, she was unable to understand what had happened to her, why she
had done this.81
Much later still, lying on her bed, the woman remembered what she had done outside the cellar in
Stalingrad, and she thought to herself, “‘I was a fool then, and I’m still a fool now.’”82
The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas was greatly impressed with Life and Fate, and not just be-
cause of its plot or its excellent writing.83 He was affected most of all by the many scenes and stories
in the book depicting unaccountable acts of kindness passing from one person to another, most of
which were performed under circumstances in which one might expect the twin impulses of self-
regard and self-preservation to be at their strongest.84 Indeed, Levinas went so far as to interpret
the novel as a quasi-philosophical text full of meaning about the essential nature of human good-
ness.85 To distill a rich and variegated body of philosophical work to its essence, Levinas (and proba-
bly Grossman, too) believed that human goodness as such cannot be reduced to or explained by a
person’s compliance with ethical or legal norms, nor can it be equated with an individual “prefer-
ence” for goodness that could be quantified and compared with other individual preferences accord-
75. Id. at 408-09.
76. Id. at 803.
77. Id. at 804.
78. Id. at 805.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 805-06.
82. Id. at 806.
83. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, IS IT RIGHTEOUS TO BE?: INTERVIEWS WITH EMMANUEL LEVINAS 80 (Jill Robbins ed., 2001).
84. Id. at 81.
85. Id.
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ing to some sort of politico-scientific calculus.86 As I have said elsewhere, Levinas fixates on “the
phenomenal irrationality of the ubiquitous small kindnesses that pass between strangers before rea-
son has ‘explained’ them by reducing them to calculations based on short- or long-term reciprocity.”87
The difficulty of understanding these small kindnesses lies much deeper than the familiar
question of whether it is legitimate for economists to make interpersonal comparisons of utility by
transforming ordinal values into cardinal ones.88 Rather, the real difficulty posed by the phenome-
non of senseless kindness has to do with the very possibility of rational explanation itself: if human
kindness arises from the particularities of each case rather than from the generality of a norm or
preference that aspires to control or at least explain all of the cases that fall under it, then it follows
that the faculty of reason can neither control nor properly account for primordial kindness as a phe-
nomenon. Senseless kindness reminds us of the fundamental uncertainty of human action; it tends
to confirm Hannah Arendt’s observation “that we never quite know what we are doing when we be-
gin to act into the web of interrelationships and mutual dependencies that constitute the field of ac-
tion.”89 Despite (or perhaps because of) the ubiquity of this kind of uncertainty, responsible decision-
oriented technologies such as CBA are always seeking to achieve the most efficient technical solution
to difficult social problems. As a result, such technologies by their very nature cannot see the point
or value of studying any human behaviors that do not generate “data” that might contribute to a de-
finitive solution. From this point of view, if the possibility of an unintended negative consequence
can be foreseen, then its value can be calculated and incorporated into the analysis. And if it cannot
be foreseen, well, then, the most that one can do is gamely follow the advice in one of Wittgenstein’s
best (and pithiest) aphorisms: “What the eye doesn’t see the heart doesn’t grieve over.”90
Richard Zerbe has expressed CBA’s attitude toward any information that does not contribute to
an efficient public policy solution by putting what is at stake in terms of a kind of competition be-
tween different methods of decision making: “If the government uses [the] KH or KHZ [criteria of
efficiency] for evaluating all of its decisions instead of using some other criteria[,] it has the best
chance of making all of the people in a society better off ‘at the end of the day.’”91 However honestly
and fervently held this opinion may be, its very mode of expression confirms Bernard Stiegler’s de-
scription of the modern “technocratic state”—a state that “no longer has as its aim either the encour-
agement of communicative action or the achievement of a critical distance toward purposive-rational
action.”92 Instead, the technocratic state’s “activity consists in finding solutions to questions of a
technical nature, those that escape public discussion.”93 By characterizing policymaking as a purely
technical problem, thinkers such as Zerbe overlook the possibility that other “methods” of policymak-
ing might actually constitute ends and not just means—that they might express the kind of rational-
ity that Weber calls Wertrationalität: behavior that is believed to possess intrinsic value or inherent
rightness, even if it does not lead to policy outcomes that are efficient when measured by the sum of
86. Id.
87. LOUIS E. WOLCHER, BEYOND TRANSCENDENCE IN LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 142 (2005).
88. In the present context, “ordinal” means a definite ranking of goods (1st, 2nd, 3rd, etc.) within a set of available goods
whose order is determined by a single actor’s particular utility function. “Cardinal” refers to an absolute ranking of goods (1,
2, 3, etc.) on the basis of some criterion other than a particular actor’s utility function. Thus, the proposition “If they all cost
the same, A prefers ice cream to broccoli, and broccoli to gruel” expresses something about A’s ordinal utility, whereas “Ice
cream is better than broccoli, and broccoli is better than gruel” is a proposition of cardinal utility that purports to be valid for
all actors.
89. HANNAH ARENDT, THE PROMISE OF POLITICS 56 (Jerome Kohn ed., 2005) (noting that this uncertainty “was considered
by ancient philosophy to be the one supreme argument against the seriousness of human affairs”).
90. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 101e (G.H. Von Wright et al. eds., G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., M.I.T. Press 1967) (1956).
91. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 28. The particular criteria animating the forms of efficiency that are mentioned in text will
be discussed later.
92. BERNARD STIEGLER, TECHNICS AND TIME, 1, at 12 (Richard Beardsworth & George Collins trans., Stan. Univ. Press
1998) (1994).
93. Id.
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people’s pre-behavior preferences.94 In short, CBA fails to consider the possibility that the coming-
and-being-together of political discussion and mutual learning about a policy problem might be part
of the good life itself, if not also a catalyst that can reshape the terms of the problem and people’s
feelings about it. Zerbe’s remark shows that CBA instead conceives of decision making methods in
terms of costs that (regrettably) must be borne in the pursuit of solutions to problems the contents of
which remain unaffected by the way in which they are decided.
Likewise, defining policymaking solely in terms of competing methods for making the mass of
people in general better off in the future cannot explain a fact that is well known to any law profes-
sor who has ever tried, in good faith, to teach the insights of law-and-economics in the classroom:
namely, that many (or even most) law students seem viscerally averse to reducing problems of deci-
sion making—legal or otherwise—to the ex ante calculation of costs and benefits according to the cri-
terion of efficiency.95 What can or should CBA do with a preference to avoid CBA itself in favor of,
say, deontological modes of decision making such as Kant’s Categorical Imperative,96 or even just
asking decision makers to obey the ancient maxim fiat justitia pereat mundis?97 As Lon Fuller’s well-
developed procedural theory of natural law shows, people can have moral preferences for the way de-
cisions are made that are at least as strong as their preferences for the contents of those decisions.98
And since there is no reason in principle why CBA ought not apply to procedures as well as to sub-
stance, the worrying possibility that this presents for the continued existence of CBA as a discipline
is obvious. This possibility can be metaphorically illustrated by the tale of the Cheshire Cat in Al-
ice’s Adventures in Wonderland: this remarkable cat proceeded to vanish, bit by bit, in response to
Alice’s persistent questioning, leaving only a faint grin to bear witness to the fact that it had ever ex-
isted at all.99 To put the matter at stake more directly, and in CBA’s own terms: if the preference for
exclusively deontological modes of decision making (and against teleological methods such as CBA) is
or becomes sufficiently widespread in society, and if the preference is backed up by a large enough
aggregate WTP, then it would seem to follow from CBA’s own methods and criteria that it ought to
willingly choose to go out of business, or at least to cease offering any more policy advice to govern-
ment decision makers.
Levinas astutely observes that the numerous acts of senseless kindness described in Life and
Fate do not call for any political action, just as they do not preach anything that could be called an
ethical doctrine.100 On the contrary, “the scenes of goodness in an inhuman world are disseminated
throughout the book, without transforming it into a virtuous book for virtuous readers.”101 The many
simple acts of kindness that appear in the course of the novel are “exterior to all system,” Levinas
claims, and they leave the mind to grasp (if it can) a kind of “ethics without ethical system” in which
“the only thing that remains is individual goodness, from man to man.”102 Levinas even interprets
Life and Fate as a kind of argument against all efforts to rationalize or systematize the kind of be-
havior that the book celebrates:
[Grossman] thinks that the “small goodness” from one person to his fellowman is lost and deformed
as soon as it seeks organization and universality and system, as soon as it opts for doctrine, a trea-
tise of politics and theology, a party, a state, and even a church. Yet it remains the sole refuge of the
94. BRUBAKER, supra note 27, at 51-53.
95. Here I can cite only a quarter-century of my own experience in teaching contracts and torts to first-year law students,
as well as the hearsay evidence about colleagues witnessing the same kind of reluctance in their students.
96. As is well known, Kant eschewed all forms of consequentialism in matters of ethics in favor of a mode of decision mak-
ing that focuses on the intrinsic rightness of the action that is willed. See KANT, supra note 36, at 155 (“A good will is good not
because of what it performs or effects, nor by its aptness for attaining some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the voli-
tion.”).
97. “Let justice be done even if the world should perish.”
98. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
99. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 63-67 (Grosset & Dunlap 1946) (1865).
100. LEVINAS, supra note 83, at 89-90.
101. Id. at 81.
102. Id.
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good in being. Unbeaten, it undergoes the violence of evil, which, as small goodness, it can neither
vanquish nor drive out. A little kindness going only from man to man, not crossing distances to get
to the places where events and forces unfold! A remarkable utopia of the good or the secret of its be-
yond.103
As this passage suggests, Levinas undoubtedly would have been horrified at the prospect of any
social-scientific effort to account for the phenomenon of senseless kindness by reducing it to a politi-
cal factoid the numerical value of which could then be compared with the numerical values of other
political factoids: horrified, in other words, by CBA. This is in part because CBA concerns itself with
the formal and static structure of “things” rather than with the fluidity of phenomena as they show
themselves through time.104 Seen from the latter point of view, an “event” is always singular and
never universal. It is always open to—indeed nurtured by—what Alain Badiou calls the “surprise of
the unexpected.”105 CBA attempts to smother the unexpected with an intervention that violently ab-
stracts preferences from the unpredictable context of their formation. And there is no better exam-
ple of this than CBA’s interpretation of the phenomenon of kindness as the mere expression of a
well-formed “preference for altruism.”
IV. The “Preference for Altruism”
Recent CBA scholarship has made a determined effort to transform the so-called preference for
altruism into a monetary value that can be measured in terms of the market-oriented categories of
WTP and WTA. Zerbe, for instance, argues that CBA should henceforth define as a “good” any value
or outcome for which there is a WTP, and he criticizes the traditional economic literature for its arbi-
trary tendency to ignore and exclude from its calculations many people’s obvious WTP for the values
of fairness and kindness toward others.106 On this question he is right: any economic analysis that
ignores “soft” goods like fairness that people are actually willing to pay for risks being accused of
overt political bias. But note: the “regard for others” that Zerbe identifies as a good must be capable
of showing itself as a preference before the project whose net social value it is the job of the economist
to ascertain. Margaret Spillane tells a story about Samuel Beckett that nicely illustrates the cate-
gory of such a well-defined ex ante preference for altruism:
Beckett was well-known among Paris street people as an easy touch. Once while on a stroll with a
friend, a beggar offered his tale of misfortune, and the playwright produced a generous offering.
Shouldn’t you consider the possibility, the friend asked, that the beggar was taking advantage of
you? Replied Beckett: “I just couldn’t take the chance.”107
This amusing story is consistent with the commonly held view that some people are by nature
more kindly than others, while some are by nature inclined more toward what Hobbes calls “our
naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like.”108 The view that every
act of altruism is the ineluctable consequence of a constant character trait or disposition is dogmatic
and pre-critical, however, for it fails to account for the phenomenon of senseless kindness. In con-
trast to the well-bounded, conscious, and even calculating preference for altruism displayed in the
foregoing story about Beckett and the beggar, the sort of kindness that Grossman describes in Life
and Fate cannot show itself before the deed. It cannot, by its very nature or definition, fall within
what CBA would call an ex ante set of preferences or utility function. This is because senseless
kindness displays a peculiar property in the way it comes into being: it does not implement an ear-
lier preference for altruism, but rather erupts with no prior warning, in a way that squarely contra-
103. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ENTRE NOUS: ON THINKING-OF-THE-OTHER 230 (Michael B. Smith & Barbara Harshav trans.,
1998) (1991).
104. SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 20.
105. ALAIN BADIOU, INFINITE THOUGHT 56 (Oliver Feltham & Justin Clemens eds. & trans., 2003).
106. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 24-26.
107. Margaret Spillane, Beckett at 100, THE NATION, May 15, 2006, at 22.
108. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 87 (Ernest Rhys ed., E. P. Dutton & Co. 1914) (1651).
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dicts the actor’s previous preference for the very opposite of altruism.109 This kind of behavior is
“senseless” in the very precise sense that it contradicts the claims of instrumental reason, which ar-
gue against it on the basis of what is known about the actor’s pre-behavior preferences.
Of course, if cases of senseless kindness exist, then cases of “senseless cruelty,” in which an ac-
tor’s ex ante preference for altruism suddenly becomes its opposite, probably also exist.110 But we are
not concerned here with deciding which of these two phenomena is more common. Instead, we
should consider the categories of senseless kindness and senseless cruelty together, and from the
vantage point of what unites them. It then becomes possible to recognize that these two phenomena
are opposite extremes that mark the boundaries of a general principle of relative social inconstancy
in the formation and expression of human preferences. The point is not just that people often change
their minds about what they want. The point is that they can, and do, change their minds and their
behaviors as a consequence of being-with-others in particular ways. To express the principle of rela-
tive social inconstancy formally: whenever human beings actually get together in face-to-face en-
counters, it is always possible that something unexpected will happen between them to alter their
preferences, either completely (the preference for X becomes a preference for its opposite, as in sense-
less kindness) or partially (an actor’s WTP or WTA changes, or his preference for X becomes a pref-
erence for something that is merely like X). For the sake of simplicity, I will continue to use the phe-
nomenon of senseless kindness as the essay’s primary example of the principle of relative social
inconstancy. Accordingly, the time has come to investigate the phenomenological structure of this
sort of human interaction more closely.
Senseless kindness is the product of a concrete encounter between human beings who, suddenly
and perhaps even unwillingly, find themselves standing face-to-face with one another. To use a
powerful image drawn from the work of Levinas,111 in the quite literal nakedness of the other’s face
can be glimpsed the phenomena of distress and mortality, for every face-to-face encounter between
two people—and not just friends—is haunted by the certainty that one of them will outlive the
other.112 I say “can be glimpsed” to indicate that the inevitable death of the other is not necessarily
(or even often) encountered as an explicit theme, but that the primordial experience of this truth
shows itself as an existential possibility in every face-to-face relationship. Levinas describes the
phenomenal structure of this kind of encounter in vivid, almost lyrical terms:
But that face facing me, in its expression—in its mortality—summons me, demands me, requires
me: as if the invisible death faced by the face of the other—pure alterity, separate, somehow, from
any whole—were ‘my business.’ As if, unknown by the other whom already, in the nakedness of his
face, it concerns, it ‘regarded me’ before its confrontation with me, before being the death that stares
me, myself, in the face. The death of the other man puts me on the spot, calls me into question, as if
I, by my possible indifference, became the accomplice of that death, invisible to the other who is ex-
posed to it; and as if, even before being condemned to it myself, I had to answer for that death of the
other, and not leave the other alone to his deathly solitude. It is precisely in that recalling of me to
my responsibility by the face that summons me, that demands me, that requires me—it is in that
calling into question—that the other is my neighbour.113
It is important to understand that Levinas’s description of the ethical encounter that leads to
109. See LEVINAS, supra note 83, at 89 (describing senseless kindness as an unforeseen act of goodness that occurs despite
the fact that the actor actually hates the beneficiary of his or her kindness).
110. Imagine an actor who genuinely wants to help people in the abstract, but who winds up actually hurting them (and
wanting to hurt them) as a sudden consequence of having concrete dealings with them: this would be a case of “senseless cru-
elty.” (I am tempted to cite the federal government’s ongoing reaction to the African-American victims of Hurricane Katrina
as an example, but I will leave the regrettably easy task of supplying actual examples of senseless cruelty to the reader’s own
memory and imagination.)
111. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, Meaning and Sense, in BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 33, 54 (Adriaan Peperzak et al. eds.,
1996).
112. Derrida speaks of this certainty in terms of the relationship between friends, both of whom know that one of them will
outlive the other; on account of this mutual knowledge of mortality, the friends become what Derrida calls “virtual survivors”
in life. JACQUES DERRIDA, THE WORK OF MOURNING 171 (Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Naas eds., 2001).
113. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ALTERITY AND TRANSCENDENCE 24-25 (Michael Smith trans., 1999).
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senseless kindness is not an argument for senseless kindness, as if there were too little of it in the
world and he wanted to encourage people to be nicer to one another. This way of putting it wrongly
imagines that senseless kindness is an event that one can plan for or take aim at on the basis of an
ethical norm or individual preference that could be taught, as it were, in Sunday school. The phe-
nomenal facts of the case are otherwise: the essence of senseless kindness consists in the fact that it
stealthily comes upon or surprises the one who, all of a sudden, finds herself inexplicably exhibiting
kindness toward another human being. In short, Levinas attempts to give a rigorous phenomenol-
ogical description of what is (at least sometimes) rather than a normative lecture about what ought
to be. He wants to describe something that just happens in daily life—albeit usually in small ways
that fly under the radar of political and social theory—even if it is also true that the counter-
phenomena of cruelty, greed, and selfishness are often more visible to us.
From the “ex ante point of view” that informs the modern quest for economic rationality, the
possibility that this kind of unpredictable encounter might pop up to disturb an actor’s well-thought-
out plans and projects involves what CBA (if not the actor) would classify as a “transaction cost.” In
other words, mainstream economic theory interprets an unwanted face-to-face encounter between
people as a burden rather than a benefit, and it counts the reduction of transaction costs as an a pri-
ori gain rather than the loss of an opportunity for something new and unexpected to emerge. As this
attitude toward transaction costs suggests, mainstream economic theory nurtures a general political
preference for market solutions to individual and social problems.114 While the origin of this prefer-
ence for markets is a normative commitment to efficiency, the preferred means—the market as
such—consists in people coming together in real or virtual face-to-face encounters.115 Indeed, the very
existence of the discipline of CBA is based on the recognition that there can be significant barriers
(transaction costs) that prevent otherwise willing people from coming together to achieve efficien-
cies.116 The idea that the law should mimic hypothetical market solutions when transaction costs
prevent real market solutions is simply a corollary of economists’ general preference for markets.117
Since it generally considers the pursuit of government “projects” to be a second-best solution, CBA
argues that public policy ought to be guided, or at least informed, by an analysis of the hypothetical
things that people would willingly do with, and to, one another if there were no transaction costs.118
The phenomenon of senseless kindness and the general principle of the relative social incon-
stancy of preferences that it illustrates pose an acute challenge to this way of thinking, for they im-
ply that the coming-together process is not just, or at least not necessarily, a “cost.” If we take this
phenomenon as a symbol for the general thesis that something unexpected yet desirable can arise
whenever human beings interact, it means that coming together can be a transformative event. In-
deed, thinkers such as Habermas have even argued that there is an intimate connection between
coming together in discussion and the concept of rationality itself.119 In earnest discussion about
what is to be done, the participants make claims that they attempt to vindicate and criticize through
arguments.120 As Habermas says, “[i]n virtue of their criticizability, rational expressions also admit
of improvement,” which implies that to be closed to argument—to be “deaf” to it—is to be irra-
tional.121 In attempting to ground our own claims we learn from others, and in learning from others
we expose ourselves to the possibility of change. Thus, “[w]e call a person rational who interprets
the nature of his desires and feelings . . . in the light of culturally established standards of value, but
especially if he can adopt a reflective attitude to the very value standards through which desires and
114. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 16 (2003).
115. See 1 WEBER, supra note 20, at 635 (describing “the market”).
116. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 9.
117. POSNER, supra note 114, at 251.
118. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 14-33.
119. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 40, at 17.
120. 1 id. at 18.
121. 1 id.
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feelings are interpreted.”122 By bringing us to see certain aspects of a problem that we did not see be-
fore, the “coming together” of discussion changes us, and thus can change what we prefer.
Of course, not all instances of people coming together involve the prospect of rational and open-
minded argumentation. In many routine economic transactions an increase in transaction costs
would admittedly burden the parties without any realistic chance of significantly changing them or
their preferences: one thinks of such simple examples as paying bridge tolls, buying bread, and rec-
onciling bank statements. If CBA limited the range of application of its theory to these kinds of hu-
man interactions, however, it would be of limited utility to policymakers trying to decide questions of
a distinctly political nature, such as whether abortion should be made more or less available to
women, whether the law should allow or disallow the cloning of human beings, and whether there
should be more or less offshore drilling for oil. In situations like these, one could argue that what we
need is more discussion (more “transaction costs”), not less—more opportunity for people to test their
preferences, and possibly change them, as a consequence of their interactions with others. To walk a
mile in the other’s shoes, as the saying goes, does not necessarily reveal an ex ante preference for al-
truism. Rather, the attitude that the saying recommends is a necessary precondition for any delib-
eration in the political sphere that aspires to become rational in the largest and most important
sense of the word: namely, the rational evaluation of one’s own ultimate ends in light of knowledge
about the ultimate ends of others. Socrates famously said that the unexamined life is not worth liv-
ing.123 But one need not go as far as he does to conclude that at least an unexamined preference is not
worth having.
If open discussion of the sort Habermas envisages is the quintessence of rationality, then the
preferences of those who exhibit senseless kindness in Life and Fate undergo the kind of metamor-
phosis that is, if you will, pre-rational, and that is triggered by what CBA would call the “transaction
cost” of a face-to-face encounter. All of a sudden there appears, out of nowhere, what CBA would un-
doubtedly recognize as a brand new set of preferences or utility function. Before the Germans en-
tered her hut, the peasant woman would probably have been “willing to pay” for all the enemy sol-
diers in her village, wounded and unwounded alike, to be strangled; indeed, she says as much
herself, the very instant before she finds herself giving water and comfort to the gut-shot German
who is lying on her cot.124 An intended course of action that threatens to become its own negation
once the transaction costs of its implementation are incurred is, to say the least, a very curious kind
of revealed preference. Although economists sometimes say that inefficiency arises only in dynamic
societies,125 the emergence of unexpected choices as a consequence of interpersonal contact seems to
show that certain kinds of efficiencies can arise only when dynamic conditions change people’s pref-
erences. One way or another, one feels entitled to ask what the prospect of this kind of plasticity in
preferences and behavior means for the very concept of economic rationality.
V. Economic Rationality
As we have seen, economists usually interpret transaction costs as something negative or bad—
as barriers obstructing the consummation of otherwise efficient transactions.126 To illustrate: if A’s
WTP for a good owned by B is $100, and B’s WTA for this good is $90, then in a world without trans-
action costs A will acquire the good from B at some price between $90 and $100, and, in the absence
of any negative externalities,127 the resulting state of affairs will be a Pareto improvement on its
122. 1 id. at 20.
123. PLATO, Socrates’ Defense (Apology), in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 22, at 3, 23.
124. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 409.
125. See, e.g., ZERBE, supra note 10, at 66.
126. Id. at 22.
127. A “negative externality” is a cost that the parties to a transaction do not bear, but that the transaction itself imposes
on one or more other people who, in principle, would be willing to pay to avoid it. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 40 (1988) (defining “externalities”).
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predecessor.128 But if it would cost the parties jointly at least $11 in transaction costs (travel costs,
negotiation costs, etc.) to complete this transaction, then economic theory predicts that A and B will
not bother to do it, since no price between $90 and $100 would defray the joint transaction costs that
are necessary to effectuate the exchange.129 Presumably the opportunity cost130 of spending the $11 to
consummate this transaction consists of a set of other, more highly valued, uses of the parties’ time
and resources. This being so, the theory predicts that they will not choose to spend the $11 here, de-
spite the fact that both of them would be better off if the underlying substantive exchange were to
occur.
Predictably, matters are not quite as simple and straightforward as this example indicates
when it comes to cases in which the principle of the relative social inconstancy of preferences holds
sway. The previous analysis of senseless kindness shows that there are situations in which the cost-
prohibitive circumstance of incurring certain transaction costs somehow transforms the very oppo-
site of an actor’s original preference into the good that she now desires. It is as if a person’s WTA of
a million dollars for her last piece of bread suddenly and unaccountably became her WTP for that
bread to be transferred to another. One could even generalize and reformulate this example as a
formal paradox: there is a class of cases such that the circumstance of incurring the inefficiency of
excessive transaction costs—owing to a prior miscalculation or to compulsion—leads to a transaction
that nonetheless becomes efficient solely because the costs of engaging in it have produced a trans-
formation of the parties’ preferences. Even more generally, one could say that the possibility of the
socially determined unexpected as such puts into question the very nature of economic rationality.
One need not be a sociologist to recognize that senseless kindness, coming as it does to disrupt prior
preferences and redirect action away from their realization, makes visible the challenge that the in-
terconnected phenomena of temporality and human sociality pose to the definition of the “ex ante” in
economic theory.
Richard Posner correctly observes that “to an economist people who will not make exchanges
that improve their net welfare are irrational.”131 But it is also true that today’s economic theorists do
not assess an individual’s net welfare in terms of universal criteria, or cardinal utility: it is for the
individual herself to decide which goods, or bundle of goods, will make her best off relative to her
preferences.132 As I have noted already, recent economic theory has introduced the altruistic regard
for others into CBA—a theoretical move that thankfully dispels the widely-held misconception that
the criterion of economic rationality is satisfied only by choices that maximize an individual’s selfish
material interests.133 After all, if I would be willing to pay for a more equal distribution of resources
in society, despite the fact that my own monetary income might decline as a consequence, there is no
non-dogmatic (or at least non-normative) point of view that can reproach my choice as irrational.134
Notice that this relatively modest theoretical concession to the possibility of a WTP for altruistic
ends is not the same as claiming, as John Rawls does, that the concept of rational self-regard logi-
cally entails that social institutions be arranged so as to maximize the portion of the least well-off in
society.135 As we have seen, microeconomic theory makes no claims about universal rational values.
128. “A Pareto optimum is a state of affairs such that no one can be made better off without making someone else worse off.
A change in the economy is said to represent a Pareto improvement if at least one person is made better off as a result of the
change and no person is made worse off.” ZERBE, supra note 10, at 3. The Pareto test is the most rigorous criterion of effi-
ciency in modern economic theory.
129. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 127, at 85.
130. The “opportunity cost” of a chosen course of action is all the other courses of action that the actor could have chosen,
but that are now foreclosed to him on account of the course he did choose. Id. at 101.
131. POSNER, supra note 114, at 51.
132. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 127, at 17-20.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
134. Although nothing of importance depends on it here, it should be noted that one consequence of including the prefer-
ence for altruism in efficiency calculations is that a state of affairs can arise in which aggregate WTPs outweigh aggregate
WTAs without the potential compensation test being satisfied. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 19.
135. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 151 (1971).
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Rather, its procedures correspond to Weber’s well-known schema of rational action: (1) an action is
regarded as subjectively rational if it is directed toward a goal that the actor values, whatever that
goal may be; and (2) the action is taken to be objectively irrational only if the actor adopts means to
achieve his selected goal that are less well-suited than other available means.136 In other words,
“subjective rationality” is a purely descriptive category—the actor just has whatever preferences she
has, for whatever reason—whereas the category of “objective rationality,” although unquestionably
normative, is limited to assessing the effectiveness of the technique the actor has adopted to achieve
her particular end.137
To put this another way, CBA believes it is required to accept individual preferences as primor-
dial givens for purposes of its analyses of net social welfare. That is, as a matter of principle, WTPs
and WTAs are supposed to be functions of what people just happen to prefer at any given point in
time, and never functions of what a CBA analyst thinks they must or ought to prefer. In theory, the
decision of a monk who has taken a vow of poverty to get rid of all his money and possessions is just
as economically rational as the average person’s decision to work overtime in order to earn more of
what the monk is trying to give away. However, the stipulation that all preferences are radically
subjective in this way underscores how important it is for CBA to select the “right” point in time to
sum them up, for people’s preferences can and often do change. If I am willing to pay $1 for an apple
instead of a candy bar at t1, and this point in time is the taken to be the relevant ex ante, then my
subsequent behavior of buying a candy bar at t2 appears irrational. On the other hand, if we take t2
as the relevant ex ante, then my new preference for a candy bar over an apple makes my act of pur-
chasing it look rational. It all depends on which “when” the analyst selects.
The problem of selecting the right ex ante is even more difficult in the context of trying to give a
theoretical account of the phenomenon of senseless kindness. Consider, for instance, the two exam-
ples from Life and Fate. As of which ex ante are the Russian women’s preferences (and hence their
welfare) to be determined: the ex ante that precedes the moment of facing the hated German soldiers
toward whom the women will subsequently act “irrationally” by displaying senseless kindness, or the
ex ante that all of a sudden bursts forth to reflect their new desire to be kind to the needy human be-
ings whom they face, and that therefore shows their behavior to be “rational”? And if, as Zerbe
maintains emphatically, the proper purpose of CBA is “to provide useful information to the decision
maker, and not to furnish the decision itself,”138 then what “information” should the decision maker
get if the possibility of an unpredictable social transformation of an individual’s preferences lurks
just around the temporal corner of any given analysis of ex ante WTPs and WTAs?
Among other things, these questions show that method matters. The way we approach any giv-
en subject matter determines not just how we proceed but also what we look for and find. Einstein
stressed this dialectical relationship between the “how” of method and the “what” of facts when he
said, “How a magnitude is measured is what it is.”139 CBA is no exception to Einstein’s rule. What
CBA looks for and finds is a mathematical relationship between WTPs and WTAs. Calling these
phenomena themselves manifestations of individual preferences, CBA proceeds to sum them up and
then recommend (or at least provide “information” about) hypothetical end-states according to a test
that most mainstream economists and lawyers accept as the definition of “economic efficiency”: the
Kaldor-Hicks (KH) efficiency criterion.140 While KH can be expressed in a variety of ways, for pur-
136. BRUBAKER, supra note 27, at 53-55.
137. Id.
138. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 16 (emphasis added).
139. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS 200 (Raymond Hargreaves & Roger White eds. & trans., 1975).
140. Also known as the “potential compensation” and “wealth maximization” test, KH arose in response to the impractica-
bility of using the Pareto criterion of efficiency as a tool of public policy. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 4. The latter requires both
that at least one person will be made better off by the move from the status quo to the proposed new state, and that no one
will be made worse off. Id. at 3. “Potential compensation” assures that the winners in the new state are able, in theory, to
compensate the losers for their losses, with net gains remaining that improve the winners’ welfare relative to their previous
positions. In other words, KH is aimed at increasing net social welfare, which is why Richard Posner has called it the “wealth
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poses of this essay I will adopt the definition given by Boadway and Bruce: “[S]tate a is preferable to
another state if, in the other state, it is not possible, hypothetically, to carry out lump-sum redistri-
bution so that everyone could be made as well off as in state a.”141
The questions posed above show that a tool or criterion of public policy that asks what indi-
viduals would be willing to pay or accept for something is useless without a temporal reference-
point—a determination of when they would be willing to open their wallets or part with their posses-
sions. This observation about method makes it possible to recognize that there is an entire philoso-
phy of time and history implicit in Boadway’s and Bruce’s definition of economic efficiency. Not only
does the notion of a “state” in which people “have” preferences presuppose a discrete point in time at
which their WTPs (to change this state to another state) and WTAs (to let the change occur) can be
measured, but also this notion interprets time itself as a mere sequence of “states,” each of which,
when viewed in isolation, is static and fully determinable. CBA refers to the original state-in-time of
a given series of states as the “ex ante perspective” (literally “from [or out of] before,” in Latin).142
Since the problem that CBA wants to solve is whether a move from one state to another state is effi-
cient, CBA answers the question, “Before what?” with the concept of the “project.”143 From a purely
logical point of view, a project consists in the means that would have to be adopted to achieve the
purely hypothetical end-state under review—an idealized new state that may or may not be more ef-
ficient than the ex ante state. This shows how CBA conceives of legitimate public policymaking in
democratic societies: namely, in terms of a self-conscious movement from a static and real present
“state” to a static and hypothetical future “state” on the basis of people’s preferences as measured be-
fore progress toward the second state begins.
Well-established scientific methods tend to assert their hegemony over every problem that falls
within their domain, including new problems that seem to question the accuracy of their findings or
the legitimacy of their conclusions.144 Perhaps this is inevitable, for as Arendt correctly observes, in
the act of judgment “[o]nly the individual case is judged, not the standard [of judgment] itself or
whether it is an appropriate measure of what it is used to measure.”145 Hence, given CBA’s presup-
positions about time and history, it would be understandable if its practitioners preferred to achieve
a technical economic solution to the “problem” of senseless kindness. One possible solution would be
to evade the problem altogether by asserting that any given value of WTP or WTA already includes
the subjectively liquidated possibility that its bearer will subsequently and unexpectedly change her
mind. The difficulty with this solution is obvious: how is the actor supposed to know what discount
rate to pick if the possibility of change is truly unexpected to her? A more plausible alternative
would be to attempt to account objectively for the possibility of preference reversal by incorporating
it into the model on the basis of empirical evidence that would not necessarily be available to the ac-
tor. In the case of senseless kindness, for example, one could discount the present value of an actor’s
ex ante preference for the very opposite of kindness by the general probability that an actor like her
might choose to be kind as a consequence of a subsequent social interaction.146 To illustrate: if the
peasant woman in Life and Fate would have been willing to pay something to have the wounded sol-
dier in her cottage strangled before he asked her for some water, then we could reduce the value of
her WTP for this “project” by the ex ante probability that she might subsequently change her mind
maximization” test. Id. at 5. Whether the redistribution actually occurs is not a requirement of the KH test as such, although
Zerbe has called for actual compensation to be included in CBA calculations to the extent that there is any willingness to pay
for it. Id. at 18. Zerbe’s modification of KH, primarily through his inclusion of the preference for altruistic goods within CBA,
has led him and other economists to change the test’s name to “KHM,” for Kaldor-Hicks-Moral. See Richard O. Zerbe, Yoram
Bauman & Aaron Finkle, An Aggregate Measure for Benefit-Cost Analysis, 58 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 449 (2006).
141. NORMAN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 97 (1984).
142. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (8th ed. 1999).
143. See, e.g., ZERBE, supra note 10, at 16.
144. See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
145. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 102.
146. Of course, in a world without transaction costs this information would also be available to the actor, who could then
discount her own WTP or WTA in the same way that an economic observer could.
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and feel kindly toward him. Only by this means could CBA begin to conform its calculations to an
existential truth that ought to be visible to any rational adult who has ever tried to accomplish some-
thing in the world: namely, that much, if not most, of history is “made by men who never know what
they are doing and always arrive at letting loose, as it were, something different from what they
[originally] intended and wanted to happen.”147 Accounting for senseless kindness in this way would
then seem to be a simple matter computing the overall empirical frequency of its occurrence. And in
principle one could perform the same kind of operation to account for the possibility of senseless cru-
elty.
However attractive or plausible this theoretical solution may appear, there are two reasons why
it will not suffice. The first is merely technical. It will be recalled that senseless kindness and
senseless cruelty are limiting cases of a much larger category, the principle of the relative social in-
constancy of preferences. If one takes as one’s object of analysis the more general phenomenon of an
unexpected change in preferences as a consequence of human interaction, then it is difficult to see how
a reliable discount factor could ever be ascertained, since the set of possible outcomes is well-nigh in-
finite. In other words, senseless kindness and senseless cruelty tend to exhibit a binary structure:
we know what the actor’s initial preference is, and we need only consider the possibility that the very
antithesis of this outcome will be the one that she winds up preferring. The case is otherwise for
situations that fall between these two extremes: who knows all of the novel solutions or strange new
worlds that might be imagined if the people who would be affected by a proposed project had an am-
ple opportunity to discuss and debate it, face to face?
Despite the cogency of this rhetorical question, its claim of epistemological difficulty or uncer-
tainty hardly furnishes a fully satisfying theoretical answer to CBA in this context. The second ob-
jection to any attempt to hastily enact a merely technical solution to the present problem is quite dif-
ferent. This objection is far more radical and will lead us into a decisive confrontation with the very
essence of CBA as a socio-political institution. In brief: even if CBA were to discover an adequate
actuarial solution to all of the technical problems that are raised by the principle of the relative so-
cial inconstancy of preferences, such a solution would suffer from the absence of any critical reflec-
tion on the ultimate meaning of senseless kindness for humans as social and political beings. At pre-
sent, the practitioners of CBA take the meaning of their factual findings to be self-evident: if the
sum of all the WTPs for a proposed project exceeds the sum of all its WTAs, then society in general
would be better off than it is at present, relative to the bankable preferences of its members, if the
project were to proceed. But there is something important that is missing from this commonsensical
interpretation of CBA’s findings: namely, serious reflection about the difference between a fact and
the meaning of a fact.
VI. Facts and Meaning
Understanding the difference between a fact and its meaning is absolutely essential to any
thinking that aspires to be non-dogmatic. At one level the difference is obvious: the sheer physical
fact that a particular traffic light is colored red, for example, is obviously not the same as what its
redness signifies to drivers. Much less obvious is the distinction between the purely factual vignettes
that Grossman calls “senseless kindness,”148 each of which is a one-of-a-kind event that will never
happen again, and what these stories signify about possibilities for democratic politics that go be-
yond those envisioned or presupposed by CBA. Given CBA’s relentlessly mathematical interpreta-
tion of human preferences, it is useful to illustrate the fact/meaning dichotomy here by drawing an
analogy to Husserl’s meditations on modern mathematics.149 Husserl, who was the founder of phe-
147. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 16.
148. GROSSMAN, supra note 1, at 409.
149. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 21-100. For a respectful but relentless deconstruction of Husserl’s most important text on
mathematics, see JACQUES DERRIDA, EDMUND HUSSERL’S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY: AN INTRODUCTION (John Leavey trans.,
Univ. of Neb. Press 1989) (1962).
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nomenology as a self-conscious philosophical movement, became interested in the historical fact that
modern algebra had seemingly reduced geometrical thought from the status of the origin of signifi-
cant descriptions of spatio-temporal idealities to that of a mere calculating machine.150 To illustrate:
modern algebra replaces the evocative idea of a circle as an area that is inscribed by a straight line of
determinate length as it rotates 360 degrees around a single point in two-dimensional space with the
more rigorous and useful formula for a circle, x2 + y2 = r2.151 Husserl concedes that this kind of meth-
odological change in the way geometry is practiced constitutes a clear advancement in mathematical
technique, but he nonetheless goes on to observe that the change brought with it a major transfor-
mation in the meaning of mathematics.152
Kant had attempted to demonstrate, in Critique of Pure Reason, that the proofs of classical
Euclidean geometry more or less correspond to, or mirror, our concrete intuitions of space.153 Alge-
braic geometry radically transforms the relationship between proof and intuition by making the for-
mer into a set of pure numerical configurations.154 It is worth quoting at some length Husserl’s in-
terpretation of the significance of this ultimately technological shift in the nature of mathematical
phenomena:
In algebraic calculation, one lets the geometric signification recede into the background as a matter
of course, indeed one drops it altogether; one calculates, remembering only at the end that the num-
bers signify magnitudes. Of course one does not calculate “mechanically,” as in ordinary numerical
calculation; one thinks, one invents, one makes discoveries—but they have acquired, unnoticed, a
displaced, “symbolic” meaning. . . . Like arithmetic itself, in technically developing its methodology
[algebraic geometry] is drawn into a process of transformation, through which it becomes a sort of
technique; that is, it becomes a mere art of achieving, through a calculating technique according to
technical rules, results the genuine sense of whose truth can be attained only by concretely intuitive
thinking actually directed at the subject matter itself. But now [only] those modes of thought, those
types of clarity which are indispensable for a technique as such, are in action. One operates with
letters and with signs for connections and relations (+, X, =, etc.), according to rules of the game for
arranging them together in a way essentially not different, in fact, from a game of cards or chess.
Here the original thinking that genuinely gives meaning to this technical process and truth to the
correct results . . . is excluded.155
In this passage Husserl makes a very specific philosophical point that echoes a similar one made by
Spinoza more than 200 years earlier,156 and that foreshadows some of the ideas that would appear,
decades later, in Wittgenstein’s mature philosophy of mathematics.157 The point is quite simple: the
truth of mathematical propositions (what we call mathematical knowledge) depends upon more than
just a correct series of calculations. A mathematical proposition may be proved, but it is not
understood unless and until it can be viewed with perspicuity—until a concrete image gives meaning
to the symbols in the proof.158 As Wittgenstein puts it:
Perspicuity is part of proof. If the process by means of which I get a result were not surveyable, I
might indeed make a note that this number is what comes out—but what fact is this supposed to
confirm for me? I don’t know “what is supposed to come out.”159
While much more could be said, both pro and con, about the ultimate significance of imaginabil-
150. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 44-46.
151. See DOUGLAS DOWNING, DICTIONARY OF MATHEMATICS TERMS 41-42 (2d ed. 1995).
152. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 46-48.
153. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 158 (Paul Guyer & Allen Wood eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1998) (1781).
154. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 43-46.
155. Id. at 44-46.
156. See BENEDICT DE SPINOZA, On the Improvement of the Understanding, in ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE
UNDERSTANDING; THE ETHICS; CORRESPONDENCE 1, 24-27 (R.H.M. Elwes ed. & trans., Dover Publ’ns 1955) (arguing that
well-formed conceptions are the test of the truth or falsity of mathematical ideas).
157. See S.G. SHANKER, WITTGENSTEIN AND THE TURNING-POINT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS 120-60 (1987) (stat-
ing that proofs must be “surveyable”).
158. HUSSERL, supra note 47, at 40-45.
159. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 90, at 45e.
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ity and perspicuity in mathematics, for present purposes it is sufficient to notice a more general as-
pect of Husserl’s analysis: namely, his recognition that, when it comes to scientific techniques, there
is a fundamental conceptual distinction between facts and the meaning of facts.
Taking Husserl’s distinction between facts and meaning as our clue, it becomes possible to in-
terpret CBA as a quintessential manifestation of what Husserl’s most famous student, Martin Hei-
degger, would come to call “the framework” (Ge-stell).160 According to Heidegger, the framework is
none other than an entire orientation to being-in-the-world: it subjects the natural and social worlds
to the imperatives of mastery and possession according to correct procedure.161 Of course, it goes
without saying that pre-modern humans also desired to master and possess their environment. But
only modern humans seek to master and control everything on the basis of correct procedure. Caught
in the web of the framework, modern human beings devote themselves to the planning and calculat-
ing of everything, to such a degree that reality itself is allowed to appear only within the horizon of
what can be calculated.162 As a spawn of the metaphysical tradition of subjectivity that began in ear-
nest with Descartes, CBA projects a math sis universalis over human relationships, and it identifies
the essence of human reason with calculation.163 In practicing CBA, the “I think” of the Cartesian
cogito, ergo sum164 finds objectivity in purely arithmetical relations, in the summing-up of relevant
numerical data. Objectivity (as thus determined) permits conclusions to be drawn and political ac-
tion to be oriented on the basis of criteria that present themselves as apolitical, if not anti-political.
Among other things, this means that CBA does not conceive of a political project as the ongoing
product of the complex give-and-take of interpersonal dialogue and persuasion among equals, as it
may have been in the polis of ancient Athenian democracy during its golden age.165 The hypothetical
project about which people are supposed to have measurable WTPs and WTAs does not have to be
made up by them, and indeed almost never is. On the contrary, it is an idealized conception of a
state of affairs that does not in fact exist, and whose contents are usually determined by politicians
or interest groups eager to “sell” it to the public. CBA therefore interprets the project as a hypothe-
sis whose ideality is firmly secured in advance by some human agency or other so that it may then be
sold to the highest bidders in a “market” that determines what is and is not efficient. As the quota-
tion marks around the word “market” indicate, however, this market is virtual rather than real, just
as the project itself is merely hypothetical. This is because the whole point of CBA is to gather in-
formation about the idea of projects for which existing, real markets do not provide solutions. CBA’s
virtual market, governed by a rigorously mathematical conception of efficiency, becomes the frame-
work that decision makers feel they should impose on the concrete flow of historical time. It follows
that CBA cannot be adequately understood if it is conceived of as merely a means—a mere “practical
measure” for “practical people,” as Zerbe puts it.166 It must also be understood as a way of revealing
what is real—a way of being and thinking that does not simply apply a neutral method to pre-
methodological “facts,” but rather determines in advance what counts as a fact.
At this point, I do not think it would be unfair to mention my rather un-scientific impression,
based on my countless conversations with CBA aficionados, of CBA’s generally baleful attitude to-
ward politics. In a nutshell, it seems to me that many or most of those who are drawn to CBA as a
policymaking tool construe politics as a slimy if not dangerous practice. If this is so, then CBA
shares in the deeply-embedded intellectual antipathy to politics that Arendt traces to a fundamental
160. HEIDEGGER, supra note 26, at 19.
161. For a general discussion of Heidegger’s critique of modern technology and “technological thinking,” see WOLCHER, su-
pra note 87, at 65-120.
162. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE 35 (J. Glenn Gray ed., Joan Stambaugh trans., Harper & Row 1969)
(1957).
163. 1 RENÉ DESCARTES, Meditations on First Philosophy, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 1, 17 (John
Cottingham et al. trans., 1985).
164. 2 id.
165. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 117.
166. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 1.
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conflict between philosophy and politics in Western thought—a conflict which began with the trial of
Socrates and was thereafter nurtured by the powerful influence of Plato’s political philosophy.167
This conflict reached its apogee in Hegel's critique of democracy, which asserts that the radical sepa-
ration of the individual from the state in the modern world168 means that democracy is impossible—
that democracy implies or risks a complete dissolution of the state into purely private interests, and
therefore that the existence of a wise monarchical or tyrannical ruler is necessary to articulate the
universal and preserve it from the interested onslaughts of the particular.169 When democratic poli-
tics is seen from a jaundiced and mistrustful point of view such as this, it can always appear as a
mere means in the service of the well-formed selfish ends of interested persons and groups.170 This
view burdens political interventions with the a priori suspicion that they will make most people
worse off at the end of the day with reference to individual preferences that are themselves regarded
as pre- or a-political. President Reagan distilled this suspicion to its essence when he uttered the fol-
lowing infamous remark in 1988: “There seems to be an increasing awareness of something we
Americans have known for some time: that the ten most dangerous words in the English language
are, ‘Hi, I’m from the Government, and I’m here to help.’”171 For those who harbor such sentiments,
politics must truly seem to be “the continuation of war by other means.”172
Arendt’s idea that politics, in the largest sense of the word, is an end in itself—that it is the
never-ending endeavor of human beings to live together and share the earth—is completely foreign
to this way of thinking.173 The so-called “transaction costs” of political interaction in her sense are
not deadweight losses imposed from without on preferences that would otherwise exist without poli-
tics. On the contrary, political interaction constitutes the very actuality of what are called individual
preferences about public matters, at least when the phenomenon of having preferences is considered
as a concrete, rather than an abstract, manifestation of human life. To be sure, it is always possible
to dip one’s net into the river of time at this or that arbitrary moment, and to bring up a pallid and
one-time expression of the balance between WTPs and WTAs in relation to a hypothetical project the
prospect of which is more or less given to people on a “take it or leave it” basis. Indeed, the democ-
ratic institution of popular voting in referenda follows just this model of decision making. But any
strong comparison between CBA and the referendum process would be inapt, for CBA is definitely
not a popularly authorized voting apparatus, nor are the projects it analyzes decided by counting of-
ficial ballots on the democratic principle of one-man-one-vote.174 On the contrary, CBA is unabash-
edly and explicitly plutocratic in its methods, inasmuch as the very concept of willingness to pay pre-
supposes that the political process has already distributed a set of entitlements with which
preference-holders could pay.175 Moreover, as a matter of principle, CBA can have nothing to say
about the legitimacy, or even the efficiency, of any given distribution of entitlements, since the nor-
mative concept of efficiency presupposes that entitlements have already been distributed.176
167. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 5-39.
168 As opposed to the ancient Greek world, where it is said that "the fashionable public life was the custom of all …, it was an im-
mediate unity of the universal and the singular … a work of art in which no part was separated from the whole."  JEAN HYPPOLITE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 62 (Bond Harris & Jacqueline Bouchard Spurlock trans., 1996). 
169 Id. at 64-65. 
 170. For a useful analysis of the social-theoretical aspects of this “conflict” model of politics, which is embraced by many
people on both sides of the political spectrum, see MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 247-49 (1987).
171. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to Representatives of the Future Farmers of America (July 28, 1988) (transcript
available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1988/072888.c.htm).
172. MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED” 15 (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey
trans., Picador 2003) (1997). Foucault strikingly inverted the famous epigram derived from Clausewitz, who said (in transla-
tion), “War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of
the same by other means.” JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 544 (15th ed., Emily Morison Beck ed., 1980).
173. ARENDT, supra note 89 passim.
174. See Walter M. Frank, Help Wanted: The Constitutional Case Against Gerrymandering to Protect Constitutional In-
cumbents, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227, 235 (2006).
175. KELMAN, supra note 170, at 74-76.
176. Kelman’s way of expressing this point is typical: “[T]he theory that rights might mirror the outcome of transactionally
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If the ultimate foundation of politics should consist in the individual and her choices, as democ-
ratic liberalism maintains, then it is also true that “[c]hoices are manifest at particular points in
time, but individuals have ongoing identities.”177 To express this point more precisely, in Hegelian
terms: the truth of a person’s political preferences is not what her WTPs or WTAs are at any par-
ticular moment in time, but rather what her preferences are constantly becoming as a concrete result
of her ongoing interactions and experiences with others.178 Although Hegel developed a reactionary
political theory of his own on the basis of this insight, it was Arendt, as we shall see in the next two
sections, who transformed his insight into the dialectics of human existence into a particularly at-
tractive positive vision of political becoming on the basis of individual freedom and democratic prin-
ciples.179 Always a melancholy realist, she acknowledged that there is an “extraordinarily narrow ho-
rizon of experience left open to us for politics commensurate with the experiences of our century.”180
She even admitted that “[p]olitics as such has existed so rarely and in so few places that, historically
speaking, only a few great epochs have known it and turned it into a reality.”181 Nevertheless, her
extraordinary idea that genuine deliberative democracy can be an end in itself, rather than just an-
other “method” of decision making, gamely attempts to re-conceive our relationships with others
from a model of strife and competition to a model of discussion and cooperation among free people
sharing the earth with others as members of a political community.182 This thesis, however idealistic
and utopian it may appear from the jaded standpoint of twenty-first-century American political ex-
perience, stands in the sharpest possible contrast to the presuppositions and tendencies of CBA.
And this very contrast reveals a schism that is inherently political rather than scientific.
VII. CBA’s Antipathy to Democratic Politics
Disclaiming in advance any intention to fawn on the ancients, I will begin our investigation of
this political schism by citing Aristotle, who wrote that “man is by nature a political animal [z on
politikon].”183 This definition implies that anyone who dwells outside the political community lives a
kind of mutilated or non-human existence, which Aristotle compares to that of “an isolated piece at
draughts.”184 “Political animal” in Aristotle’s sense does not just mean that human beings join politi-
cal parties or like to read newspapers. It means that by their very nature people tend to form and
sustain communities in which the genuine conduct of public and private affairs is first made possi-
ble.185 “Politics” derives from the Greek word polis, meaning “city-state,” which constituted the
Greeks’ primary form of political community.186 Indeed, in Periclean Athens at the height of its glory
it was felt that the entire life of the state was contained in its politeia.187 A cognate of the word “po-
lis,” politeia signifies the unity of culture and politics, as well as of private and public life, within the
confines of the polis.188 To this end, the dominant cultural ideal of Athenian democracy required all
freeborn male citizens to discharge their public duties through mutual interaction and the discussion
costless bargains is inexorably indeterminate in that there is no way to determine which rights people possess when they en-
ter this universal bargain to determine rights, and no way of determining how much market power each person has unless one
has already determined those rights.” Id. at 75.
177. Id. at 130.
178. See generally HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 105-223 (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1821) (discussing
the dialectical unfolding of “Ethical Life,” or Sittlichkeit, within the context of the state).
179. See generally ARENDT, supra note 89, at 70-200.
180. Id. at 197.
181. Id. at 119.
182. See generally id. at 115-53.
183. 2 ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 1987 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
184. 2 id. at 1988.
185. 2 id. at 1986-1988.
186. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 117.
187. 1 WERNER JAEGER, PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 409-10 (2d ed., Gilbert Highet trans., 1939).
188. 1 id. at 410.
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of public affairs189 in the agora (literally, “marketplace”), the central space for the exercise of freedom
in the city, where it was believed that men could move around and speak freely with their equals.190
These days it is quite common for people in mature democratic societies such as the United
States to view civic responsibility as a burden or hassle.191 But it would appear that the Greeks saw
the matter differently. Far from being thought of as a curse or burden, the “bond of friendship and
union” between men that Socrates places at the very foundation of the polis,192 indicates a thesis or
attitude that may sound strange to modern ears—one that the formal structure of CBA cannot ac-
commodate. The thesis in question is not nearly as broad as Marx’s collectivistic conception of the
“species-life” of human beings,193 but rather consists in the more modest claim that human interac-
tions have a positive influence or value that goes far beyond whatever “projects” they may happen to
ratify or initiate.194 For the Greeks, human interaction and discussion in the agora were not just
means to establish previously determined public and private ends, because thinking about politics in
this way would have impermissibly reduced free Athenian citizens to the unequal status of ruler and
ruled.195 As Arendt puts it, “The Greeks understood the polis as the public-political realm in which
men attain their full humanity, their full reality as men, not only because they are (as in the privacy
of the household) but also because they appear.”196 According to this ancient Greek ideal of popular
democracy, the dialogue of free citizens in the agora was a necessary step toward the formation of
wise ends and wise citizens.197
The funeral oration of Pericles, as recounted by Thucydides, makes this last point explicitly:
Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens,
though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters; for, unlike any
other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we
Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate, and instead of looking on discussion
as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action
at all.198
The Athenian view that public and private discourse is a good thing—that it is not a “stumbling
block in the way of action,” but rather a necessary precondition for wise action—can be described in
modern economic terms by the proposition that human interactions are prima facie net benefits
rather than net costs. Whether or not Pericles accurately depicts political conditions in mid-fifth-
century Athens, it is clear that the general bias of modern economists, including the practitioners of
law-and-economics, on the subject of human interactions is the exact opposite of the one he
expresses. Modern economic theory tends to interpret human discourse as a cost to be overcome or
minimized, rather than celebrated.
According to the standard economic account of transaction costs, the burden of dealing with
others, if incurred, will reduce the net value of any resulting transaction, and if not incurred, will be
suspected of having prevented the consummation of a mutually beneficial exchange. Either way,
transaction costs are said to be bad. The following passage, from a popular series of books describing
various legal topics, is typical:
A problem, which Professor Coase readily recognized, is that virtually all exchanges have a cost.
These costs are called transaction costs. It is important to note that a transaction cost is not the
price of an item or a right. Instead, it is the cost of the transaction itself. These costs include search
189. 1 id.
190. ARENDT, supra note 89, at xxvi, 131.
191. See Bob Herbert, Of Campaigns and Breakfast Cereals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at A19.
192. PLATO, Protagoras, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 22, at 308, 319-20.
193. KARL MARX, Bruno Bauer, Die Judenfrage, in EARLY WRITINGS 3, 13 (T.B. Bottomore ed. & trans., 1964).
194. Id. at 172.
195. 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 183, at 1986-2000.
196. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 21.
197. Id. at xxvi, 119.
198. THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 109-110 (Richard Crawley trans., Random House 1982) (n.d.) (emphasis
added).
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costs, information costs, the cost of meetings, negotiations, and any other costs incurred to make the
primary exchange occur. If these costs exceed the gain from the exchange itself, the exchange will
not take place.199
The presumption that human interactions are “costs” is associated with Ronald Coase’s enormously
influential article The Problem of Social Cost.200 One of the primary implications of Coase’s work is
that people often choose inefficient solutions to social problems “in order to avoid the cost of getting
together,” as Mitchell Polinsky puts it (thereby making it appear that “getting together” is something
humans generally would rather not do).201 Law-and-economics scholars also subscribe to the
normative idea that the law ought to facilitate private agreements by reducing transaction costs,
including “the need . . . to communicate information,” as Douglas Baird says (thereby implying that
human discourse is generally an unwanted burden).202 Finally, as noted earlier, many scholars
believe that judges ought to decide difficult legal cases so that the result mimics the outcome that
the parties would have achieved had there been no transaction costs.203
As one of the principal applications of modern economic theory, CBA echoes the general antipa-
thy to transaction costs that can be found in abundance in the law-and-economics literature. More-
over, CBA practitioners imagine that we know our goals in advance, if given the right amount of “in-
formation,” and that this knowledge automatically sanctions the use of the most efficient means for
achieving them. CBA’s calculations cannot accommodate the possibility that our political goals
might actually be “up for grabs” so long as we act as social beings during the polis-like activity of
thinking, talking and being with one another. While I do not mean to suggest that we ought to re-
turn to the conditions of Athenian democracy, unjustly built as it was on the backs of slaves and the
legal subordination of women,204 I do want to criticize the idea that human interactions are first and
foremost costs that should be avoided or minimized. I want to suggest that what economic theory
calls the “transaction costs” of human discourse is actually what makes people into free and respon-
sible agents in the first place. Habermas is right that there is an internal relation between the ca-
pacity for instrumental reason and the capacity for reaching inter-subjective understanding about
things and events.205 This is because an actor’s successful use of instrumental reason in a social con-
text implies the ability to make his point of view understood by others whose cooperative actions are
necessary to achieve his ends. Habermas calls the latter ability “communicative action,” and his
analysis suggests that empiricist research traditions such as CBA have put the idea of communica-
tive, social rationality into a kind of intellectual quarantine, leaving only instances of pure instru-
mental rationality to be analyzed and measured.206
This quarantine allows CBA to conceive of human beings as vessels that at any given point in
time are chock full of well-formed preferences. Since it is undeniable that conditions in the real
world are always changing, however, this means that CBA must interpret inefficiencies as the prod-
uct of institutional failure. That is, it must allege that legal rules have failed to keep pace with
changes in sentiments, knowledge, or technology. Zerbe’s version of the argument is illustrative:
“Inefficiency arises only in a nonstatic society—that is, a dynamic society. When conditions change a
different, new rule may lower transaction costs or create new property for which rights need to be
assigned, or a change in conditions may create an inefficient divergence between psychological and
199. JEFFREY HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 72 (3d ed. 2003).
200. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
201. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 15, 11-14 (3d ed. 2003).
202. Douglas Baird, The Law and Economics of Contract Damages, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 49, 61
(Eric Posner ed., 2000); accord COOTER & ULEN, supra note 127, at 101 (interpreting communications costs as “obstacles to
cooperation”).
203. POSNER, supra note 114, at 251.
204. See, e.g., John R. Kroger, The Philosophical Foundations of Roman Law: Aristotle, the Stoics, and Roman Theories of
Natural Law, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 905, 919-20 (discussing Aristotle’s justification of slavery); id. at 919 n.68 (discussing status
of women under classical Athenian law).
205. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 40, at 14.
206. See 1 id.
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legal ownership.”207 This way of thinking about the relationship between preferences and entitle-
ments rests on the belief that these two spheres are functionally autonomous from one another. It
supposes that public institutions such as law are merely the externally imposed mechanism within
which bargaining in the private sphere transpires. There is no clearer example of this belief than
CBA’s concept of “tautological efficiency,” the view that if the costs of changing legal rules are taken
into account, then “every society is always completely efficient as a tautology.”208 The idea seems to
be that if the costs of a rule-change were small enough, then the change, if it is efficient, would have
already occurred; and if the change in rules has not occurred, this proves that it would not be cost-
justified.
This way of thinking about the relation between social and legal change contains an inherent
logical limitation. By interpreting time as a succession of static “states,” each one of which is full of
well-formed preferences, CBA leaves itself powerless to account for how preferences change, or even
how they stay the same. At best it can only observe that preferences have changed or stayed the
same, once they have been manifested. Nowhere in Zerbe’s thesis of tautological efficiency does the
possibility appear that legal rules and other public institutions are or could be an ongoing project
and product of the kind of communicative action among individuals that thinkers such as Habermas
and Arendt imagine they might be. Communicative action of this sort cannot know in advance ex-
actly where it is going. Nor can it guarantee in advance that CBA will be able to bless its outcomes
as efficient, since efficiency requires evaluation according to a prior “state” that, however recently it
may have been measured, may no longer be relevant to what people have now talked themselves into
wanting. In brief, this is exactly the problem that the meaning of the phenomenon of senseless kind-
ness creates for the concept of economic rationality.
To say that people can talk themselves into wanting something different than they did before
they started talking with one another is obviously not the same as saying that this kind of behavior
is irrational. On the contrary, human interaction, even if it is sometimes undesired before the fact,
allows people the space for what Kant called “spontaneity.”209 In brief, spontaneity means the capac-
ity to initiate new ideas, understandings, and preferences as a consequence of our interactions with
others.210 The realm of spontaneity is the exact opposite of the realm of necessity that CBA con-
structs in determining the relation between individual ends and the means used for their accom-
plishment. For CBA, a person’s preference for or against project X automatically links up with its
means, either a measurable WTP to achieve X, or a measurable WTA to avoid it. Thus, all spontane-
ity is excluded from the calculus. But notice: without spontaneity people could never commence
anything new. They would remain perpetual slaves of their unchangeable wants, mere tools of pre-
viously articulated preferences that they are helpless to avoid or alter. This observation about the
relationship between preferences and spontaneity suggests the truth of Arendt’s surprising thesis
that politics and freedom are actually the same:
Only in the freedom of our speaking with one another does the world, as that about which we speak,
emerge in its objectivity and visibility from all sides. Living in a real world and speaking with one
another about it are basically one and the same. . . . Freedom to depart and begin something new
and unheard-of or . . . the freedom to interact in speech with many others and experience the diver-
sity that the world always is in its totality—most certainly was and is not the end purpose of poli-
tics . . . something that can be achieved by political means. It is rather the substance and meaning
of all things political. In this sense, politics and freedom are identical.211
Arendt’s point is really quite simple: to be completely locked within oneself and one’s desires
(which in any case is metaphysically impossible) is to exist without freedom, in the precise sense of
existing without any reason to imagine or begin something new. Never surprised, such a being
207. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 66.
208. Id. at 65.
209. KANT, supra note 153, at 193.
210. Id. at 193-95.
211. ARENDT, supra note 89, at xxx-xxxi.
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would be perpetually enslaved to what is boringly familiar to it, like a zoo animal in a cage. It takes
talking and being with others to imagine and create change—to disturb the given world and trans-
form it into what it can become.212 Even a solitary individual maintains a kind of virtual companion-
ship in his thoughts, in the form of what Plato calls the eme emaut , or internal dialogue that one
has with oneself,213 in which one prepares for the real dialogues with others that will come later. If
we use the word politics as Arendt does—as a name for the basic human phenomenon of “venturing
forth in speech and deed in the company of one’s peers, beginning something new whose end cannot
be known in advance, founding a public realm (res publica or republic), promising and forgiving oth-
ers”214—then CBA’s preference (or prejudice) against politics becomes clear. Indeed, it would not be
too strong to say that this preference exhibits hostility to freedom itself: not the kind of irrational
freedom of choice that knows no community and emerges out of nowhere, but rather the rational
kind of freedom for choice that can only come to those who are able to conceive and begin something
new by interacting with their peers.. By reducing the concept “human being” to a preference-holding
individual in the singular, and “humanity” to a mere multiple of this singularity, CBA renders itself
incapable of accounting for or nurturing human freedom in this sense. What is more, CBA’s methods
and presuppositions represent more than just a set of semi-arbitrary scientific stipulations—more
than just disposable yardsticks, so to speak. Given its overtly political context and application, CBA
also constitutes a powerful and widely-held ideology of human nature, one which pre-orients how we
go about (and should go about, if we are “rational”) forming preferences and making choices.
Of course, the word “ideology” does not define itself. In order to underscore what is at stake in
our reflections on CBA, and for the sake of clarity, this essay will therefore appropriate Karl Mann-
heim’s classic definition of the term:
The concept “ideology” reflects the one discovery which emerged from political conflict, namely, that
ruling groups can in their thinking become so intensively interest-bound to a situation that they are
simply no longer able to see certain facts which would undermine their sense of domination. There
is implicit in the word “ideology” the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of
certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabi-
lizes it.215
Our previous analyses of the phenomenon of senseless kindness, and of the Greek concept of politics,
have already brought to light what CBA cannot (or will not) see about the nature of human
preference-formation. In a nutshell: CBA’s methods, geared entirely to generating technocratic
solutions to the problem of this or that political “project,” steer thought away from the truths of
human freedom and desire. These truths lie in the social dimension of preferences—in the fact that
preferences, as they actually exist in historical time, show themselves phenomenologically as a
ceaseless becoming in the context of being-with-others. The time has now come to point out the
distinctly political dimension, in the modern sense of the word “political,” of what CBA does not
allow its followers and supporters to see.
VIII. The Politics of CBA
Even a preference against politics is a kind of politics in the sense that it is a value to which its
supporters cling and for which they are prepared to struggle. To illustrate the importance of this
point, we will analyze the iconic “world without transaction costs” that Coase constructs (and CBA
constantly cites) to show why there is a divergence in the real world between private and social
costs.216 The main point of Coase’s project is to demonstrate that transaction costs actually are in-
212. This point is meant to be explicitly Hegelian in content and tone. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
111-19 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977) (1807) (the famous “Lordship and Bondage” dialectic).
213. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 19-21.
214. Id. at viii.
215. KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 40 (Louis Wirth & Edward Shils trans., Harvest Books 1936).
216. Coase, supra note 200 passim.
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credibly important barriers to efficiency in the real world,217 and his genius was to do this by imagin-
ing a world in which no pesky transaction costs ever intervene between preferences and their effi-
cient instantiation. This thought experiment shows that in an environment that is stipulated to
have zero transaction costs, goods will inevitably wind up in the hands of those who value them most
(as measured by their WTPs and WTAs), and that this will happen regardless of how and to whom
the law initially distributes the goods in question.218 Although it has been shown that Coase’s con-
clusions do not hold in cases where a person’s WTA for a good that he owns exceeds his WTP for that
good if he had to purchase it from another (the “offer-asking problem”),219 the uses to which Coase
and others have put his imaginary world are important enough to have earned him a Nobel Prize in
economics in 1991.220
Brilliant and path-breaking as it is, Coase’s thought experiment also indirectly proves or im-
plies something that is not listed on his prize citation:221 namely, that in an environment in which
there are literally no transaction costs, people would never have reason to change their preferences,
and moreover, it would be a mystery how they could ever have developed preferences in the first
place.222 These conclusions follow from the simple fact that no “costly” interactions with other human
beings could ever rise up to affect them.223 A preference in Coase’s world224 is like an unimpeded body
moving in a perfect vacuum: it goes on forever. “All things come to be through strife,” says Heracli-
tus,225 reminding us that change always comes at a “cost,” if only the cost of learning to appreciate or
desire something new. Without the prospect of change, the people in Coase’s world lack the capacity
to initiate anything new. Lacking spontaneity, they also lack freedom. Knowing everything there is
to be known, and requiring no costly human contact to realize their preferences, the denizens of
Coase’s world are like Leibniz’s perfect monads, which “have no windows, by which anything could
come in or go out.”226 In brief, a world without transaction costs is a world without politics: the very
idea of it represents a sort of apolitical heaven for the practitioners of CBA.
As I remarked earlier, CBA has inherited a general philosophical mistrust or contempt for poli-
tics that can be traced to Plato.227 Indeed, there are many striking parallels between the theory of
CBA and Plato’s metaphysical and political ideas. The eternal ideas that Plato put above the
changeable world of appearances correspond to CBA’s “preferences,” which stand frozen in sus-
pended animation at any given point in time.228 Just as Plato thought that the eternal ideas can be
perceived by the philosopher in an act of pure beholding,229 so too CBA imagines that the ongoing
metamorphosis of preferences in social life can somehow be arrested and measured by a technician
who need not take account of the vulgar phenomenon of their becoming-in-time.230 And as Plato’s
217. RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 174-79 (1988).
218. Id.
219. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 170, at 145-48.
220. See Nobelprize.org, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991,
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1991/index.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2006).
221. Id. (announcing Coase’s award “for his discovery and clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property
rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy”).
222. Coase, supra note 217, at 175.
223. Id.
224. Coase himself rejects this terminology and has written that far from being “his” world, the imaginary world without
transaction costs “is the world of modern economic theory, one which I was hoping to persuade economists to leave.” Id. at
174. This does not imply, however, that Coase interprets transaction costs as benign, for he sees them much as other econo-
mists do—namely, as “barriers” to efficient transactions.
225. HERACLITUS, supra note 6, at 49.
226. GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNIZ, The Monadology, in PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 3, 3 (Mary Morris trans., 1934).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 167-172.
228. COASE, supra note 200, at 176-78.
229. See PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 22, at 575, 747-72 (discussing the allegory
of the cave and the theory that knowledge consists in the pure seeing of eternal Ideas).
230. Cf. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Beyond Good and Evil, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE 369, 395-96 (Helen Zimmern
trans., 1927) (noting that “the Platonic mode of thought, which was an aristocratic mode, consisted precisely in resistance to
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timeless ideas hold sway over what merely seems to be good,231 CBA’s objective preferences at any
given time likewise hold sway over what they are constantly becoming as a consequence of social in-
teraction. Plato believed that the truth of the ideas, as interpreted by the philosopher-king, should
inform politics.232 CBA recasts this theory into one in which the truth of opinions, as interpreted by
the social scientist, should inform politics.233 The truth of Plato’s ideas and the truth of CBA’s opin-
ions both fulfill the role of an origin and measure—what the Greeks called an arch —for political ac-
tion.234 In each case the arch is imposed on the changing circumstances and unstable affairs of act-
ing human beings and establishes what Arendt calls a kind of “tyranny of truth.”235 Experiences like
senseless kindness, which do not fit into the framework of either truth-as-idea or truth-as-stable-
opinion, are excluded as irrelevant by the authoritative interpreter of truth. In Plato’s case this per-
son is the philosopher-king; in CBA’s case it is the social scientist. The homology is almost perfect.
The idea that truth can be tyrannical is one of the most important insights of postmodern social
theory. It is a major corollary of a thesis of philosophical anthropology that maintains that human
beings are essentially hermeneutical creatures.236 On the negative side, to be hermeneutical means
never being able to know the world “directly,” in an unmediated burst of immaculate conceiving.237
On the positive side, it means that we always receive the world in a completely mediated way—that
we interpret238 it by means of what Heidegger calls our fore-conceptions (Vorgriffen), fore-having
(Vorhabe), and fore-sight (Vorsicht).239 Without going too far afield into the intricacies of Heideg-
gerian thought, suffice it to say that these concepts basically signify that whenever we encounter
something as such—that is, explicitly as a “tree,” as a “preference,” or as whatever—the thing in
question is already involved with us, in advance, in terms of our pre-understandings of the world and
what is significant about it.240 Sociologists call this phenomenon the “social construction of reality.”241
And the great sociologist Mannheim shows how it pertains to our concepts of knowledge and truth:
“[T]he notion of knowledge in general is dependent upon the concretely prevailing form of knowledge
and the modes of knowing expressed therein and accepted as ideal, [and] the concept of truth itself is
dependent upon the already existing types of knowledge.”242 Given this framework for thinking
about knowledge, truth becomes tyrannical whenever people forget their own socially contingent re-
lation to the forms of knowledge they employ, and then begin to insist, often forcibly, that their own
point of view is what Catherine MacKinnon calls the standard for point-of-viewlessness.243
To illustrate the idea of the tyranny of truth, consider the following rather chilling hypothetical
example, drawn from the philosophical writings of Herbert Marcuse:
A man who travels by automobile to a distant place chooses his route from the highway maps.
obvious sense-evidence,” and which took the form of “pale, cold, grey conceptual networks which they threw over the motley
whirl of the senses—the mob of the senses, as Plato said”).
231. PLATO, supra note 229, at 759 (defining pure knowledge as “the knowledge of that which always is, and not of a some-
thing which at some time comes into being and passes away”).
232. Id. at 752-58.
233. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 6-7 (discussing how opinions influence political choices under CBA).
234. See MICHAEL INWOOD, A HEIDEGGER DICTIONARY 83 (1999).
235. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 47.
236. See, e.g., HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 254-71 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans., 2d ed.
Crossroad Publ’g Corp. 1989) (1960).
237. Id. at 265-71.
238. The dictionary defines “hermeneutic” as “the study of the methodological principles of interpretation.” WEBSTER’S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 566 (1991). Although the word’s signification in philosophical thought is much broader
than this, the definition helpfully maintains the all-important connection between “hermeneutic” and the idea that human
beings interpret their world.
239. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 150 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Harper 1962) (1927).
240. Id. at 190-91.
241. See generally PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966).
242. MANNHEIM, supra note 215, at 292.
243. Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and State, 8 SIGNS: J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 635, 638-39
(1983).
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Towns, lakes and mountains appear as obstacles to be bypassed. The countryside is shaped and or-
ganized by the highway: what one finds en route is a byproduct or annex of the highway. Numerous
signs and posters tell the traveler what to do and think; they even request his attention to the beau-
ties of nature or the hallmarks of history. Others have done the thinking for him, and perhaps for
the better. Convenient parking spaces have been constructed where the broadest and most surpris-
ing view is open. Giant advertisements tell him when to stop and find the pause that refreshes.
And all of this is indeed for his benefit, safety and comfort; he receives what he wants. Business,
technics, human needs and nature are welded together into one rational and expedient mechanism.
He will fare best who follows its directions, subordinating his spontaneity to the anonymous wisdom
which ordered everything for him.244
I call this example chilling because it so accurately reflects what sheep we have become. Its all-too-
familiar particularities indicate, in a more general way, what actually goes on, day in and day out, in
societies whose members have surrendered themselves completely to the imperatives of efficiency
and instrumental rationality. Not only is the man’s behavior in Marcuse’s example perfectly
“rational” in a technological sense, but the dissolution of all rationality into semi-spontaneous
reactions to prescribed mechanical norms means that, from the standpoint of instrumental thinking,
only a crank would insist on making journeys in some other, less efficient way. The cold, wet blanket
of conformity to the “correct” thing to do makes any dissent that dares question its correctness from
the standpoint of its ultimate meaning look like a symptom of mental illness, rather than the
expression of an alternative vision of what being rational means. But the “obvious” ex ante efficiency
of the journey the man takes comes at a cost: namely, the chance that a less efficient route that
meanders through villages and past farms might actually be more rewarding to him—indeed, that it
might change what he prefers, or even who he is, by virtue of the marginal increase in inter-human
contact that it would require of him.
CBA is like the interstate highway system: no stoplights and no detours. By making human
beings into the pawns of their own previous preferences, CBA treats them as passive, not active,
agents on the highway. A passive agent is someone who is required to execute what does not neces-
sarily reflect her own desires, as in the case of a legal agent’s duty to implement her principal’s law-
ful instructions, whatever they may be. CBA treats preference holders as passive agents because it
conceives of them as having to stand by their previously measured WTPs and WTAs regardless of
what happens, or might happen, after the measurement (unless, of course, another measurement is
subsequently commissioned and performed). At one level this is understandable, for as Arendt cor-
rectly observes, modes of behavior can become objects of systematic research “only if one excludes
man as an active agent, the author of demonstrable events in the world, and demotes him to a crea-
ture who merely behaves differently in different situations, on whom one can conduct experiments,
and who, one may even hope, can ultimately be brought under control.”245 Abstracting from the life-
world in this way, CBA seeks to control or influence decision making by means of a theoretical move
(namely, the one-time measurement of WTPs and WTAs) that seems to encode people’s well-formed
desires, but that in fact leaves no institutional space for them to freely mold and remold their prefer-
ences in the course of political discussion.
The ideology that CBA is an objective scientific assessment of people’s preferences—as in the
disarming hypothetical claim, “But I’m only trying to find out what people are willing to pay for!”—
diminishes people’s ability to recognize that, as things stand now (in the United States, at least),
they utterly lack the institutional space for politics in Arendt’s sense of the term. In its effects, it
would not be inappropriate to compare CBA to those totalitarian modes of administration that im-
pose solutions from above while advertising that they are merely doing the will of the people.246 If
Arendt is right that the ultimate meaning of politics is freedom, then the meaning of CBA is the kind
244. HERBERT MARCUSE, TECHNOLOGY, WAR AND FASCISM 46 (Douglas Kellner ed., 1998).
245. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 105.
246. See MICHAEL HALBERSTAM, TOTALITARIANISM AND THE MODERN CONCEPTION OF POLITICS 20-21 (1999) (discussing to-
talitarianism’s effect on individual thought).
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of politics that seeks to control or steer freedom into servitude to “data” about what “the people” on
balance prefer about the political projects that will affect their lives. But as the legal philosopher
Lon Fuller said, “the greatness of what we call democratic government does not lie in the mere fact
that a numerical majority controls at election time, but at a point further removed from the ballot
box, in the forces which are permitted to play upon the electorate.”247 In other words, the real meas-
ure of a given society’s level of democracy does not consist in the fact that individual preference hold-
ers have a one-off chance to say what they prefer from a slate of choices they had no role in shaping.
Rather, the level of democracy in a society depends on whether its public and private institutions
make communicative rationality in the political sphere easier or harder, more open or less open,
more valued or less valued.
From a purely historical point of view, one could say that CBA’s methods attempt to abolish
what Weber calls “the knowledge of the tragedy with which all action, but especially political action,
is truly interwoven.”248 CBA does this by the simple expedient of ignoring or denying time’s relent-
less destabilization of everything solid, including especially human opinions and desires. Of course,
the law also attempts to abolish tragedy in this way: the enforcement of a legally binding contract
despite the fact that one of the parties regrets having made it is a leading case in point. Defenders of
the institution of contract sometimes legitimate this result by claiming that the law “must respect
our capacity as free and rational persons to choose our own good, and that respect means allowing
persons to take responsibility for the good they choose.”249 In effect, CBA follows the law’s lead by
implicitly construing human preferences as if they were contractually binding promises that could
not later be changed without incurring legal and perhaps moral responsibility. In contract law, what
happens after a binding promise is made—including especially any regrets and changes in the pref-
erences that led to the utterance of the promise in the first place—are generally held to be immate-
rial as a consequence of the old Latin maxim and legal principle pacta sunt servanda (“promises
must be kept”).250 But of course the metaphor of promises exchanged in a market transaction is
clearly inapt in the present context, because none of the WTPs and WTAs that CBA measures are
legally binding. They are in principle, and in fact, socially conditioned works in progress. To put it
another way: in the world of politics, unlike that of contracts, people are always free to change their
minds in response to new information and new experiences with others.
In default of any sustained political discussion and interaction among those who will be affected
by a given project, CBA’s calculations lay down ends which are offered to government officials to en-
act through law. The diffident way CBA sometimes describes the nature of its relationship to deci-
sion makers—“to provide useful information to the decision maker, and not to furnish the decision
itself”251—shows that it sees the state as the monolithic proprietor of force, rather than seeing public
force as the possible consequence of freedom in the political realm. This way of thinking about po-
litical power is far too crude. To borrow an important distinction drawn by Arendt, the ends that the
state pursues through the application or threat of legal force are not the same as the goals of poli-
tics.252 The latter “are never anything more than the guidelines and directives by which we orient
ourselves and which, as such, are never cast in stone, but whose concrete realizations are constantly
changing because we are dealing with other people who have goals.”253 Her extended discussion of
the meaning of the distinction between ends and goals brings home what is at stake in our reflec-
tions about the ideological aspects of CBA:
Only when brute force with its arsenal of means is introduced into the space between people—where
247. LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 123 (1940).
248. WEBER, Politics As a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 23, at 77, 117.
249. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 20 (1981).
250. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 142, at 1140.
251. ZERBE, supra note 10, at 16.
252. Id. at 193.
253. ARENDT, supra note 89, at 192-93.
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until that point nothing has passed back and forth except speech, which is devoid of tangible
means—do the goals of politics become ends. . . . If a political action that does not stand under the
sign of brute force does not achieve its goals . . . that does not render the political action either point-
less or meaningless. It cannot be pointless because it never pursued a “point,” that is, an end, but
has only been directed at goals, more or less successfully; and it is not meaningless because in the
back-and-forth of exchanged speech—between individuals and peoples, between states and nations—
that space in which everything else that takes place is first created and sustained. What in political
language is called a “breakdown in relations” is the abandonment of that in-between space, which all
violent action first destroys before it proceeds to annihilate those who live outside of it.254
As harsh as it may sound to say it, the institution of CBA is the harbinger of a fundamental
breakdown in political relations in Arendt’s sense. It is the tip of the spear of state force, adminis-
tered through law, which can use CBA’s findings to legitimate whatever projects the numbers hap-
pen to favor. But as it seeks to guarantee the ends (political projects) with the means (a static de-
termination of individual preferences), CBA ignores or fails to notice the fact that its means do not
correspond to human life as it is lived in history. To repeat one last time: real human preferences
are never essentially private; individual intentions, interests and desires are tied to language and
culture, and thus are inescapably social and susceptible to change. Pretending merely to describe
individual preferences, CBA actually constructs them as they would be if people never interacted
with one another. That the resulting “information” can be used and exploited politically is obvious.
That it can seem democratic, inasmuch as it scrupulously counts everyone’s “dollar votes” without
seeming to impose a solution from the outside, is equally obvious.255 What is less obvious, but none-
theless true, is that the objective information that CBA provides to policymakers is cloaked in a very
subjective and politically charged point of view on the true nature of human preferences.
Conclusion
If this essay has accomplished its purpose, it should be obvious by now that no conceivable im-
provement in the theory of CBA could ever bring it closer to the facts of the matter, for the politics of
CBA as a method for gathering and evaluating what it calls “facts” is what has been most at stake in
these meditations. CBA enacts a particular vision of what preference formation and decision making
in economically advanced democratic societies can, and should, be. In its determination to freeze the
evolution of preferences in the life-world into forms that can be counted and compared, CBA reflects
both the hyper-technological world in which it appears and the atrophied political culture that it in-
forms. This is hardly surprising, for history teaches us that an age usually gets the political institu-
tions that it deserves. If bureaucratically managed decision making on the basis of numerated indi-
vidual preferences that are modeled as being immune to change is what is wanted, then CBA is just
the ticket. Indeed, since American society currently lacks the kind of vibrant public institutions that
would allow for a fully adequate public discussion of political goals, perhaps CBA, like the ballot box
and the opinion poll, is the best chance policymakers have for discerning the public “mood.” On the
other hand, if genuine democracy means more than the counting of dollar votes cast at a discrete and
politically binding point in time—if it implies popular engagement in decision-making processes that
never guarantee the result in advance, but always leave room for something new and unforeseen to
emerge from the messy dynamics of human interaction—then it seems to me that CBA is part of the
problem rather than a contribution to the solution. For there is nothing more dangerous to any ro-
bust conception of popular democracy than the belief that the determination of “what the people
want” is safely in the hands of experts.
254. Id.
255. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 27-28.
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